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“When a subject is highly controversial...one cannot hope to tell the truth. One can only show how 
one came to hold whatever opinion one does hold.”
Virginia Woolf, A Room of One’s Own (1928).
Image on front cover taken from footage of the BBC programme Panorama: Iran - Oil, Barrels and 
Guns (1973). The statue is that of Mohammad Reza Shah. Within the film the interviewer asks 
Mohammad Reza Shah “do you think the great civilization can be a reality when people aren’t 
really free to speak their own minds?” The Shah responds “well that depends on what you mean by 
freedom...”
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Introduction
 Within his account of the Islamic Revolution, The Priest and the King, Desmond Harney, a 
former British diplomat in Teheran, made reference to the “old Iranian conviction of ‘the hand of 
the English’ (dast-e Englis-ha).”1 In a recent conversation I had with a former British Ambassador 
to Iran, the same phrase was brought up.2 It was implied that in summoning this phrase amongst 
Iranians, a laugh and a knowing look might be exchanged; insinuating that as a phrase it still carries 
a certain weight, holding a mythological status even in the twenty-first century. To prove the 
potency of the term, one has only to read Iraj Pezeshkzad’s novel, My Uncle Napoleon (1973). The 
title character, Uncle Napoleon, is obsessed with the idea that the English were behind all of Iran’s 
misfortunes. Adapted into a popular television series in 1976, both the book and series were banned 
following the Islamic Revolution, yet have continued to thrive underground.3 Given such 
widespread regard for the influence of the British, it is not surprising that the last Shah, Mohammad 
Reza Pahlavi, also perceived the British to have a hand in all Iranian affairs. This is the starting 
point for my work; the deep conviction that the British were in control.4
 The most obvious manifestations of the British presence in Iran were the British Foreign 
Office and the BBC Persian Service (henceforth BBCPS). Launched in December 1940 as part of 
the Foreign Office’s campaign to develop and increase international communications overseas, the 
BBCPS came to be viewed by Iranians as one of their most trusted news sources.5 Its main rival, in 
5
1 Desmond Harney, The Priest and the King (1998), p. 107.
2 This conversation took place in October 2013.
3 Azar Nafisi, ʻThe Secret Garden,ʼ in the Guardian review section of The Guardian (13 May 2006), p. 21, 
http://www.theguardian.com/books/2006/may/13/featuresreviews.guardianreview26
4 Charles Kurzman, The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran (2004), p. 13.
5 Annabelle Sreberny and Massoumeh Torfeh, ʻThe BBC Persian Service 1941-1979,ʼ Historical Journal of 
Film, Radio and Television (2008), 28:4, pp. 515-516.
terms of media output, was the Russian-run Radio Teheran.6 Thus there was obviously a political 
importance to the BBCPS as an alternative source of news to the pro-Communist Radio Teheran; 
and even more so in terms of a battle over news hegemony given the Cold War context of the era.
 The significance of the BBCPS, however, lies not just in its role as a media enterprise, but in 
its part in the triangle which existed between the BBCPS, the British Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office (henceforth the FCO7), and the Shah. Essentially, after the founding of the BBCPS, the BBC 
quickly became deemed to hold significant ‘power’ within Iran. Indeed Mojtaba Minovi, a Persian 
intellectual amongst the founding members of the Service, was reputed to have delivered broadcasts 
in 1941 which had ‘driven the Shah from his throne.’8 And Mohammad Reza Shah believed that he 
too faced dissent in the form of the BBCPS. The Shah’s conviction that the BBC had instigated the 
unrest which resulted in the 1979 revolution was only heightened by the BBC broadcast of an 
interview with Ayatollah Khomeini, during which images against the Shah were also featured, 
including film of the words ‘Down with the dictator Shah’ graffitied across a wall.9 In his memoirs, 
the Shah reaffirmed his suspicion of the BBC, writing ‘from the beginning of 1978 their Persian 
language broadcasts consisted of virulent attacks against my regime.’10 Was this just paranoia on 
the part of the Shah, or was it justified?
 Essentially, the foundation to the Shah’s claims lay in the direct funding of the BBC 
External Services11 by the British FCO. And as such, the Shah deemed the BBCPS to be a tool of 
the British government. The British consistently rebutted these assertions with the explanation that 
6
6 Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO): 8/2762: Review of the BBC Persian Service, (July 1976).
7 Previously known as the Foreign Office, it was renamed the Foreign and Commonwealth Office after a 
merger between the two offices in 1968.
8 BBC Memo, Miss E. Burton to Miss Edmond, Secretariat, 23 September 1941, quoted in F. Safiri and H. 
Shahidi, ʻGreat Britain xiii. The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC),ʼ Encyclopædia Iranica, XI/3, pp. 
276-286, available online at http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/great-britain-xiii (accessed 18 October 
2013).
9 Broadcast on the BBC in 1978, http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p00prspl
10 Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, The Shahʼs Story (1980), p. 163.
11 Renamed the BBC World Service in 1988.
the BBC retained editorial independence, which was seen as the cornerstone of the service’s 
credibility, and thus was in no way subservient to the will of the British government.12 Essentially 
the BBC believed that through their upholding of the value of impartiality within broadcasting, they  
provided a crucial service to the people; to the masses. And yet who actually heard, or read, the 
broadcasts? How many people had access to the technology in order to retrieve the information on 
offer? Yes, the evolution of the media was accompanied by an increase in the possibilities of the 
medium, but it was not solely an inclusive agency and should also be regarded as a means of 
exclusion. This is one dimension of a foreign media source which requires significant attention; 
what was the actual impact of the BBCPS? Was the listening audience in fact primarily made up of 
the Shah and the Iranian elite? And if so, was this preoccupation with the BBC by the Shah simply 
causing more damage to his increasingly delicate situation (circumstances which will be elucidated 
further in the first chapter) as ruler of Iran, given that his energies were directed intensely on this 
issue? There is a further problem regarding the platform of the BBC; impartiality is not a fact, it 
wavers according to a persons’ values. Furthermore, how is it possible for the Press, or in this case 
the BBC, to speak for a group or people, or a nation, who are divided in opinion?
 These are the questions which need to be considered in relation to the BBC, including the 
BBCPS, during the 1970s. Was the BBCPS reliant on the FCO for editorial guidance as a result of 
their funding? Or was there substantial leeway which allowed the broadcasters editorial control? 
Was it the BBC or the British government who was pulling the strings regarding the broadcasts of 
the BBCPS? And who were these two institutions seeking to represent; the Iranian people or British 
interests? Finally, what did the Shah hope to achieve through his sustained observation of the 
foreign press, particularly the BBC?
7
12 Sreberny and Torfeh, ʻThe BBC Persian Service 1941-1979,ʼ p. 522.
 Within this brief explanation of the tangled network of partnerships, the potential influence 
and importance of the media is discernible. Indeed, with the ever-growing prominence of the media 
worldwide, an examination of the role played by the media during the 1970s is a fascinating 
dimension of international politics to consider, providing part of the historical context from which 
the media has derived its role in current-day international affairs. In fitting with this particular 
study, a reflection on the changes in the BBC overseas services during the twentieth century 
illustrates how the broadcasting sensibilities altered in relation to the shifting context for the 
provision of these services. While originally established as an Empire Service to provide a 
connection for those living abroad, with the onslaught of the Second World War the British 
government asked the BBC to increase their output to foreign countries in order to combat the 
propaganda of rival stations; again prompting the notion of a battle being fought, alongside that of 
the military, over control of the airwaves.13 As the twentieth century unfolded, the BBC reacted 
accordingly, to the challenges of Cold War geopolitics or decolonization.14 Correspondingly, the 
media has contributed to the strengthening of relations amongst states and yet also been to the 
detriment of these same relations; it is the fourth dimension of international affairs - a reference to 
Edmund Burke’s idea of the Fourth Estate, which will be considered later.15 
 A succinct interlude is necessary here in order to explain the differences between the various 
sections of the BBC, particularly regarding the BBC World Service (BBCWS) and the BBCPS. The 
BBC World Service was originally founded as the BBC Empire Service in 1932, then renamed as 
8
13 F. Safiri and H. Shahidi, ʻGreat Britain xiii. The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC),ʼ Encyclopædia 
Iranica, XI/3, pp. 276-286, available online at http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/great-britain-xiii (accessed 
17 July 2014).
14 Alban Webb, ʻCross-Theme Research,ʼ Tuning In - Researching Diasporas at the BBC World Service, 
http://www.open.ac.uk/researchprojects/diasporas/cross-research/bbc-world-service-historical-pespectives
15 Philip M. Taylor, Global Communications, International Affairs and the Media since 1945 (1997), p. 21.
the BBC Overseas Service in 1939, before being assigned its current label in 1965.16 Furthermore, 
while initially an English-spoken service, the BBC quickly began to add broadcasts in other 
languages which in turn became their own services, such as the BBC Persian Service. Thus the 
BBCWS continues to be broadcast in English, accessible throughout the world, in addition to the 
individual BBC language services. A telegram from Nicholas Barrington, of the FCO, to Sir 
Anthony Parsons, British Ambassador to Iran from 1974-1979, provides a useful distinction 
between the two.17 In the first place, the World Service is broadcast in English and thus aimed at 
English-speaking foreigners, in contrast to the BBCPS which carries content in Persian. Moreover 
the BBCWS is aimed at a worldwide audience, and therefore differs from the BBC vernacular 
services which contain content relevant to the local audience regarding local affairs.18 Essentially, 
then, the BBC World Service is the overarching term for the various language services provided by 
the BBC, but is also a radio station in its own right. Lastly, from its founding until 1 April 2014, the 
BBCWS was funded by the FCO.19 
Recent Scholarship
 The most recent scholarship in this field, with a focus on the work of the BBC, can be found 
within a research project conducted over a four year period between 2007-11, Tuning In: 
Researching Diasporas at the BBC World Service, which was followed up by the publication in 
January 2014 of Persian Service: The BBC and British Interests in Iran.20 Markedly, the authors of 
this work, Annabelle Sreberny and Massoumeh Torfeh, have focused on framing their archival work 
9
16 ʻThe 1960s - BBC World Serviceʼ, http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/history/story/
2007/02/070122_html_60s.shtml (accessed online 28 June 2014).
17 FCO 8/2762: Telegram from N J Barrington to Sir A D Parsons on “BBC Persian Service”, (20 July 1976).
18 ibid.
19 ʻAbout - BBC World Serviceʼ, http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldserviceradio/help/faq (accessed online 28 June 
2014).
20 Annabelle Sreberny and Massoumeh Torfeh, Persian Service: The BBC and British Interests in Iran 
(2014).
within the concepts of public diplomacy and soft power in order to assess the role played by the 
BBC in its capacity as a foreign broadcaster. 
 In relation to the aforementioned Tuning In project, it is important to note that the research 
which specifically deals with the involvement of the BBCPS in British-Persian relations has been 
somewhat limited to three historical moments; the removal of Reza Shah in 1941, the UK-Iran oil 
negotiations during 1948-1953, including the Mosaddeq era, and the period immediately prior to the 
Islamic Revolution of 1979.21 The publication of Persian Service has extended this scope to include 
two more episodes which the authors have deemed to be ‘pivotal’ in some sense. The work 
incorporates BBC broadcasting to Afghanistan, and brings the whole project ‘up to date’ with 
coverage of the establishment of BBC Persian Television in 2009.
  Alternatively, I have focused on the period between 1971 and 1977; the second half of an 
era described by Ali Ansari as the ‘halcyon years of Mohammad Reza Shah’s rule.’22 From 1965, 
the decade witnessed steady economic growth within Iran, based on her oil resources, and a, not 
unconnected, elevation of the Shah on the world political stage. Significantly, Great Britain’s 
withdrawal from the Persian Gulf in 1971 provided an opportunity for Iran to reassert hegemony 
over the region after a hundred and fifty years.23 Moreover this time period also witnessed the 
celebration of 2500 years of the Iranian monarchy in a lavish ceremony at Persepolis; the 
ceremonial capital of the Achaemenid Empire, deemed the ancestors of the Persians.24 In short, the 
years 1971-1977 were important ones for the Shah as he established himself as an international 
figure presiding over a country on the verge of an economic breakthrough; and this was the image 
that the Shah wished to be presented to the world. Yet, as will be considered, this image was often at 
10
21 Sreberny and Torfeh,ʻThe BBC Persian Service 1941-1979ʼ, p. 515.
22 Ali M. Ansari, Confronting Iran (2006), p. 57.
23 J. C. Hurewitz, ʻThe Persian Gulf: British Withdrawal and Western Securityʼ, The ANNALS of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, 401 (1972), p. 114.
24 Talinn Grigor, ʻPreserving the Antique Modern: Persepolis ʼ71ʼ, Future Anterior, 2:1 (2005), p. 23.
odds with reality, and it fell to the press to report such discrepancies, much to the dismay of the 
Shah.
Methodology
 In order to consider fully the triangle of partnerships which existed between the BBC, the 
FCO and the Shah, I undertook archival research in the UK, at both the BBC Written Archives 
Centre (henceforth BBC WAC), in Reading, and the National Archives at Kew, which contains 
documents and correspondence from the FCO.25 The material at the BBC WAC ranged from 
information pertaining to particular broadcasts, programme schedules and audience ratings, to 
correspondence, and drafts of letters, between members of the BBC, or FCO, in relation to 
complaints or issues which had arisen. The majority of the correspondence relating to the BBCPS 
was done via telegram, given that this was the quickest method to convey information at the time. 
The documents in the FCO archives, which were useful for this study, consisted, for the most part, 
of communications between various members of the FCO, both in the UK and Iran, and the Iranian 
government. Some telegrams were to be, and had been, read by a number of people, a list of whom 
was often to be found on the paper copy. There were also a number of reports relating to the BBCPS 
which were distributed amongst certain individuals in the FCO. 
 The scope of my material was limited by two key factors. Firstly, given the extensive 
breadth of files in both sets of archives, I chose to search for information relating to the BBCPS by 
the title of the files. For instance, folders in the National Archives had been labelled ‘British Policy 
in Iran 1974-1978’ or ‘BBC Overseas Service to Iran (1973),’ to name but a few. These dossiers 
naturally contained a wealth of information relating to the label on the file. However, there are 
surely many more documents relating to the BBCPS in folders with other names. Yet, unfortunately, 
11
25 The labelling of the source materials differs in both archives; some documents have a title, often they have 
the name of a recipient, and usually include the author and date. However they all have a reference number 
relating to the file in which they can be located in the archives. 
due to time limits, I was unable to extend my archival research to include files other than those 
whose titles were directly relevant to the BBC and British policy in Iran. The same is true of my 
archival research in the BBC WAC. Given that it is necessary to outline the topic of research before 
a visit, I was limited, in the sense that I could not delve into any random folder, to the files provided 
for me which had been deemed relevant to the brief summary of my work I had provided. Thus it is 
clear that the scope of my sources was restricted by what exists in the aforementioned archives, and 
was available to me, and, to some extent, dependent on the labelling system of the various 
organisations.
 Moreover, it is essential to note that, fundamentally, I have limited my work to English 
sources. As such this study predominantly focuses on what was broadcast by the BBC outside of 
Iran, but in relation to Iran. These broadcasts were, however, often retransmitted in some form via 
the BBCPS, which is another intriguing dimension of the workings of the BBC in Iran. 
 Lastly, it is worth noting the phenomenon that people are more likely to complain than to 
praise.26 Thus the majority of the written sources in the archives which relate to the activities of the 
BBC are, more often than not, in connection to content which angered the Shah, and thereby proffer 
a considerably critical view of the BBC in Iran. 
 In addition to an exposition of my archival research, I will also provide a brief review on the 
book The Persian Service, mentioned earlier, given that it is has been so recently published and 
provides the most comprehensive study on research undertaken in relation to the BBCPS. Indeed it 
was after consideration of the theoretical framework used by Srberney and Torfeh in their work, that 
of public diplomacy and soft power, that I came to the decision to view my own research in relation 
to the concept of the Fourth Estate.  
12
26 Roy F. Baymeister, Ellen Bratslavsky, Catrin Finkenauer, Kathleen D. Vohs, ʻBad Is Stronger Than Goodʼ, 
Review of General Psychology, 5:4 (2001), pp. 323-370.
Chapter One - A Short History and a Book Review
The Reign of the ‘last Shah’
 Mohammad Reza Pahlavi came to the throne after the abdication of his father Reza Shah in 
1941. Young and naive in terms of ruling a country, he was described by some elder statesmen as a 
‘weak man in a strong position.’27 The strength of the position he found himself in as Shah of Iran 
is certainly debatable, as he faced challenges from both inside and outside of Iran. Indeed, the 
British role in the ousting of Reza Shah surely demonstrated that ‘others’ were, to an extent, pulling 
the strings. Denis Wright, British Ambassador to Iran between 1963-1971, even noted that it was 
the British who had ‘decided to give the young Crown Prince...a chance to prove himself,’ 
continuing that ‘he could always be got rid of if he did not come up to expectation.’28 Furthermore, 
Dr. Mossadeq’s brief expropriation of authority in 1951-53 is illustration enough of the opposition 
the Shah faced from within his own country. Importantly, though, Mohammad Reza Shah was 
convinced of the destiny of his reign, and certain that he was supported by ‘a grateful people’ who, 
he believed, mandated his rule as king.29 Ansari footnotes a statement put to the British Ambassador 
by the Shah in 1958 which conveys something of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s attitude towards 
politics. The Shah asks ‘They [the people] might perhaps serve as clay: who then is the potter?’30 
Returning from his brief exile in 1953, the Shah was convinced even more so in his status as the 
savior of his people, and the ensuing political ascendancy, in which the Shah and his supporters 
found themselves, boosted the Shah’s belief in the providence of his reign. 
 While the remainder of the decade proved relatively stable for the Shah, by the early 1960s 
it was deemed necessary by some of his closest ministers, such as Asadollah Alam and the Prime 
13
27 Ali M. Ansari, The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran (2012), p. 155.
28 Denis Wright, The Persians Amongst the English (1985), p. 214.
29 Ansari, The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran, p. 156.
30 ibid., p. 157.
Minister Ali Amini, to launch a ‘revolution from above’ in order to reinforce the Shah’s position; ‘a 
bloodless revolution that would at once take the wind out of the sails of the Shah’s critics and place 
the Shah firmly at the centre of the political stage, as a champion of the people.’31 And so, in 1963, 
the White Revolution was born, so-called in reference to the need for a revolution without 
bloodshed; ‘designed to preempt a Red Revolution.’32 Intended to rally the support of the people, 
the main aims of the White Revolution included emancipation of women, land reform, and ‘western 
modernization.’33 In turn, the people were hopeful for democracy.34 However it was during this era 
that the reverse happened, as the Shah waived the constitution and muzzled the press in order to 
attain his ‘White Revolution’ as quickly as possible.35 Indeed, it is essential to note the strict 
censorship of the Iranian press under the Shah, even though there is little documentation on it.36 
Essentially the Shah reined in the freedoms which had been enjoyed during the constitutional 
period; publishing licenses became prerequisite for newspapers, difficult to obtain, and still subject 
to censorship.37 Significantly, the Shah had postponed his coronation until a time when Iran, and the 
image of himself, were prospering.38 And yet the occasion of his crowning in 1967 might instead be 
viewed as the beginning of his fall. 
  A key signal of dissension amongst the Iranian population was the rise of a guerilla 
movement, the beginnings of which Ervand Abrahamian traces to the summer of 1963 when mass 
14
31 Ansari, The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran, p. 160.
32 Ervand Abrahamian, Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic (1993), p. 140.
33 A controversial term, but implied the progressive transition of a society from a ʻpre-modernʼ or ʻtraditionalʼ 
state to a ʻmodernʼ one, along the lines of the developments which had taken place in Europe and America.
34 Ali M. Ansari, ʻThe Myth of the White Revolution: Mohammad Reza Shah, ʻModernizationʼ and the 
Consolidation of Powerʼ, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Jul., 2001), p. 13.
35 Ansari, The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran, p. 161.
36 D. Parvaz, ʻCambridge project: Iranʼs press censorshipʼ, http://dparvaz.wordpress.com/familiar-beast-
press-censorship-in-iran/ (accessed 2 August 2014).
37 ibid.
38 The commentary from British footage of the coronation remarks that “the Shah was at last satisfied that he 
was worthy of wearing the crown.” http://www.britishpathe.com/video/shah-of-persias-coronation-state-
opening-of-parlia (accessed online 17 July 2014).
violence was used to crush peaceful demonstrations against the regime.39 Abrahamian argues that 
this instance exploited the Shah’s willingness to use force, and revealed his determination to root 
out the opposition.40 Disclosures which caused younger members, in particular, of the opposition to 
question methods of resistance and in turn to look to the tactics used in China, Cuba, and Algeria 
through translations of the work of Mao, Che Guevara and Franz Fanon.41 These ideas took root, 
and the formation of two significant guerrilla movements, the Fedayeen and the Mujahideen, 
signified a belief, amongst many leftist Iranians, in the need for an armed struggle and revolutionary  
socialism.42 The origins of both of these movements can be found in the early 1960s, evolving with 
political aid from different wings of the National Front - Mossadeq’s party.43 
 SAVAK, the Shah’s secret police, successfully managed to arrest, and/or execute, a 
significant number of members of both of these groups, to the extent that by the mid-1970s most of 
the founding members were gone and the activities of the movements had subsided. However, 
crucially, they were not completely eradicated and continued to function at a more discrete level 
until the uprisings in 1978-1979 when they re-emerged to take advantage of the revolutionary 
situation.44 The intensity with which the Shah pursued these insurgent groups, utilizing his secret 
police, is illustrative of his recognition of the delicate nature of his position and thus the need to 
quell any opposition unreservedly. The expansion of SAVAK, and routine use of torture45, further 
15
39 Ervand Abrahamian, ʻThe Guerrilla Movement in Iran, 1963-1977ʼ, MERIP Reports, No. 86 (Mar.- Apr., 
1980), p. 4.
40 ibid.
41 ibid.
42 ibid.
43 Riaz Hassan, ʻRevolutionary Islam in Iran: Popular Liberation or Religious Dictatorship? by Surdosh Irfaniʼ, 
(Review) Third World Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Apr., 1985), p. 470; Michael M. J. Fischer, ʻRevolutionary Islam 
in Iran: Popular Liberation or Religious Dictatorship? by Surdosh Irfaniʼ, (Review), International Journal of 
Middle East Studies,Vol. 18, No. 1 (Feb., 1986), p. 88.
44 Abrahamian, ʻThe Guerrilla Movement in Iran, 1963-1977ʼ, p. 12.
45 The issue of torture would continue to plague the Shah for the remainder of his reign, particularly in 
relation to human rights as organisations from Europe and America, such as Amnesty International, became 
involved. 
exemplified the frailty of the Shah’s situation.46 Moreover, reflection on the overarching views of 
the two guerilla movements provides a useful contextualization of the internal situation in Iran. 
Essentially, both wings argued that Iran was dominated by imperialism, especially from America, 
and that the White Revolution had transformed Iran from a feudal society into a bourgeois one 
heavily dependent on Western capitalism, and thereby sustained through the Shah’s veneration of 
Western leaders and their cultures.47 These accusations of imperialism, both American and British, 
would continue to surface for the remainder of the Shah’s reign.
 Aside from the National Front, and those in accord with their policies, there also existed 
another political opposition; the Tudeh party. Founded in 1941, the Tudeh party was in effect a 
restoration of the orthodox pro-Russian Iranian communist party of 1921-1931 which had been 
crushed by Reza Shah.48 As with the guerrilla movement, the Tudeh party was both purged and 
forced underground. The import of the Tudeh party, as regards this study in particular, lies in its 
relations with the Soviet Union, and the Russian attempts to make inroads into Iran.
 Lastly, the Shah faced mounting religious opposition to his rule. Significantly, state and 
religion were separated in Shiite Iran. The relationship between the monarchy and the ulama, 
however, was a complicated one. While the ulama were important allies of the Iranian monarchy, at 
times the relationship became a highly problematic one. In the Pahlavi period, this relationship 
became more strained, due, in part, to the ideas of ‘modernization’ championed by the Pahlavi 
monarchs, ideas which did not sit well with a large number of the ulama. Indeed, Mohammad Reza 
Shah’s programme of bureaucratic centralization, which continued the reforms set in motion by his 
father Reza Shah, persisted in infringing upon the autonomy previously enjoyed by the ulama; dress 
16
46 Michael Axworthy, Iran: Empire of the Mind (2007), p. 255.
47 Abrahamian, ʻThe Guerrilla Movement in Iran, 1963-1977ʼ, p. 10.
48 Fred Halliday, ʻThe Tudeh Party in Iranian Politics: Background Notesʼ, MERIP Reports, No. 86 (Mar.- Apr., 
1980), p. 22.
codes for ulama for instance.49 The land reform aspect of the Shah’s White Revolution was another 
issue which angered the ulama who viewed it as contrary to both the Constitution and the Shia 
faith, not to mention the portioning off of large quantities of land protected under waqf (religious 
endowments).50 
 Notably, there existed discord within the Iranian religious classes. Yet the highest ranking 
Shia theologian between 1937-1961 was  Ayatollah Borujerdi, a conservative apolitical cleric, who 
had come to a mutual agreement, in the 1940s, with the young Mohammad Reza Shah which 
included silencing any politically motivated members of the ulama.51 However the death of 
Borujerdi in March 1961, in addition to the controversies of the White Revolution, caused a shift in 
the relationship between the state and ulama, and some clerics became increasingly outspoken.52
 Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was one such figure, and his presence looms over the history 
of modern Iran, particularly as the figurehead of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and subsequent 
establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran. While this is not the place for an in-depth 
consideration of the role he played, it is important to note that Khomeini’s exile to Iraq in 1963, for 
berating the Shah of granting “capitulations”53 to the Americans, demonstrates that he was already, 
by the early 1960s, a prominent figure of opposition to the Shah.54 Moreover, Abrahamian concisely 
observes that Khomeini ‘transformed Shiism from a conservative quietist faith into a militant 
political ideology that challenged both the imperial powers and the country’s upper class.’55 This 
17
49 Houchang E. Chehabi, ʻStaging the Emperorʼs New Clothes: Dress Codes and Nation Building under Reza 
Shahʼ, Iranian Studies, Vol. 26, No. 3/4 (1993), p. 22.
50 Akhavi Shahrough, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran: Clergy-State Relations in the Pahlavi 
Period (1980), pp. 90-94; Ansari, Confronting Iran, p. 48; Peter Avery, Modern Iran (1965), p. 505.
51 Abrahamian, Khomeinism, p. 8.
52 Taghavi notes the passivity among the clergy, particularly regarding involvement in politics, which 
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change in the relationship between state and religion had been effected by both parties, and yet 
would predominantly be to the detriment of the Shah.
The International Arena
 If these were some, certainly not all, of the hostilities faced by the Shah from within Iran, 
what of the international context? The enterprises of Russia, as noted previously, which had 
originally been somewhat limited to the Anglo-Russian rivalry which was primarily dominated by 
the issue of oil, were increased by the ideological struggles of the Cold War. The Shah found 
himself situated within this framework; both to his advantage, and at his expense.56 As argued by 
Ansari, to lay the blame of developments in Iran on international actors would be to ‘fall victim to 
the dogma of anti-imperialism’, but at the same time the Cold War provided a ‘more radicalized and 
uncompromising vocabulary’ which seeped into the Iranian mindset.57
 In terms of the more immediate geographical location of Iran, in reference to its long 
borders shared with Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Turkmenistan, with access to both the 
Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf, and its position within an area often referred to as the Middle 
East, it was Western powers, such as the USA, who seemed to continue to dominate the politics of 
the region, rather than events elsewhere in the Middle East. The Baghdad Pact, signed in 1955 
between Iran, Iraq and Turkey, reflected both the continued dominance of the concerns of external 
powers, specifically the American notion that a regional military bloc was formed, and the shared 
interest of the monarchs of Iran and Iraq against the rising tide of nationalism.58 However the 
overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy of Iraq in 1958 drastically altered Gulf politics as Iraq 
became an unstable revolutionary republic which could challenge Iran, both in terms of her 
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influence in the region, and in relation to her monarchical political system.59 In turn the Shah was 
exceedingly wary of Iraq, especially in light of the assertion of Iraqi nationalist aspirations along 
the Iranian border, and the issue of the Kurdish question.60 Yet Iraq was of immense importance to 
the ulama as a Shia country, and especially given that the major Shia holy sites of Najaf and 
Karbala were to be found in Iraq, and thus visited by numerous Iranian pilgrims. Accordingly, the 
Iran-Iraq relationship was a further point of contention between the ulama and the Shah.
 The influence of external states also shifted during this era as an end to British military and 
administrative dominance in the Gulf was assured by decision of the British Labour Government in 
1968.61 Between 1971 and 1977, the British withdrew from Kuwait, South Yemen, Bahrain, Qatar 
and the Emirates, and Oman, and her place was filled, to an extent, by the USA, which had been 
increasing its naval presence and had become the main arms supplier to pro-western states in the 
Gulf region.62 Meanwhile relations between Iran and the USSR had cooled during the late 1950s, 
and early 1960s, to the extent that Iran felt there was no longer a threat from her Northern 
neighbour.63 But instead, the cold war conflict was now superimposed onto the regional conflict 
between Iran and Iraq as the USSR backed the new Iraqi republic. A border war between Iran and 
Iraq ensued in the years 1969-1975, primarily over the question of the frontier, but in which the 
Kurds, and their plight, became caught up in as both sides backed different Kurdish enclaves.64 The 
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settlement reached between the two states, at Algiers in 1975, included an agreement on non-
interference in each other’s internal affairs; violation of which would play a large part in the Iran-
Iraq war that raged between 1980-1988, and during which nationalist themes were rife.65
 There existed another dividing line, however, when it came to the issue of oil, which found 
Iran and Iraq together in opposition to the Saudis and other Arab Gulf states.66 Iran, Iraq and Saudi 
Arabia made up three of the five founding member states of the Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC), created at Baghdad in 1960, and which sought to ‘co-ordinate and 
unify petroleum policies among Member Countries.’67 However, disagreements emerged in the 
early 1970s as Iran and Iraq were both, broadly, of the persuasion that oil prices should be 
increased. When, in 1973, the Shah refrained from joining the Arab oil embargo which cut off oil 
exports to America in protest at American military support of Israel, and therefore against Egypt 
and Syria during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the Shah had clearly shown his ‘western’ colours.68 
 As well as angering other states within the region, the Shah’s position, as a supporter of all 
things ‘western,’69 also frustrated various groups within Iran, including the clerics. Moreover his 
accumulation of the wealth from the Iranian oil reserves, and failure to address real issues in the 
country, all amounted to the continuing deterioration of the domestic situation.70 The position of the 
Shah was clearly a fragile one, and his attempts to increasingly centralize power into his own hands 
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can be seen as an attempt to control the tenuous state of affairs, thereby making the presentation of 
a powerful image to those abroad even more essential. 
British Foreign Policy
 And what of the British role in Iran? To be sure, their priority, from the outset, was oil. 
While the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC), established in 1908, was essentially a private 
organization, in 1914 the British government invested in the company to the extent that they held 
51% of the shares.71 As such, the company began to be considered as a national enterprise, and 
many governments, including the Iranian one, saw the “hidden hand of the British” in the activities 
of the APOC.72 And when, in 1932, the Majlis declared the D’Arcy concession of 1901 to be null 
and void, the British government took up the cause of the APOC. A new concession, signed by the 
(newly-named) Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the Iranian government in April 1933, secured the 
company’s operations in Iran for the next 60 years, thereby extending the original concession by 32 
years, and effectively leaving Iranian oil revenues at the mercy of the British government and her 
tax fixing.73 
 As has already been mentioned though, the British presence in the region was waning, 
particularly following their decision to withdraw from the Gulf in 1968. Following this, their 
continued dealings with Iran were primarily concerned ‘with the promotion and protection of highly 
lucrative commercial contracts.’74 Arms sales to Iran proved particularly profitable after 1970 as the 
Shah used oil revenues to build up a military force which could secure him an authoritative position 
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in the region. In 1977, military and security expenditure in Iran accounted for 40% of the 
government’s budget; a demand which was predominantly met by America, but by Britain also.75
 Aside from mercenary interests, the British were also wary of Soviet inroads being made in 
neighbouring countries, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, and supporting the Shah was one way to 
counterbalance the potential of Soviet influence in the region.
 Notably, it is essential to remember the historical relationship between Britain and Iran 
during the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and the phenomena of national memory.76 
Recollection of British intrusion in Iranian affairs would proffer an image of British meddling, and 
for their own benefit; from the Reuters telegraph concession in 1872, and the tobacco concession 
signed in 1890, to British support of Reza Khan’s coup in 1921, and in turn their perceived role in 
the 1953 coup which ousted the popular nationalist Prime Minister Dr. Mossadeq. Moreover, 
Iranians were particularly suspicious of foreign broadcasts which had been ‘specifically beamed on 
Iran...This goes back to wartime days and also to the subsequent years when “Imperialism” was rife 
and vernacular services were universally regarded as propaganda weapons of one side or the 
other.’77 Accordingly the impression that the British were behind everything was rife in Iranian 
society; and the BBC Persian Service suffered from this same perception through association.
The role of the BBC Persian Service
 The Shah’s sensitivity to criticism proved highly problematic for the BBC Persian Service, 
and the FCO, as any mildly critical remark from the former was believed by the Shah to verify the 
British government’s adverse stance toward Iran. As such, the BBCPS had to navigate a path 
between these two political authorities, while at the same time following its own editorial policy as 
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an independent broadcaster. In Persian Service, Annabelle Sreberny and Massoumeh Torfeh have 
attempted to show the struggle faced by the BBCPS against the constraints of the FCO, which itself 
was consistently berated by the Iranian embassy. Their extensive archival research has led them to 
place their sources within the theoretical framework of public diplomacy and soft power, however 
the usefulness of these concepts is debatable in relation to the BBCPS and will be considered in the 
final chapter of this study.
Persian Service - Public Diplomacy and the Fourth Estate
 Sreberny and Torfeh refer to the ‘semantic soup of terms used to define international 
communication,’ including; propaganda, public diplomacy, psychological warfare, soft power and 
nation-branding.78 The remainder of the first chapter of the book, Persian Service, outlines the 
evolution of the terms public diplomacy and soft power, and their coinages, both British and Iranian. 
David Culbert provides a general definition of public diplomacy as ‘some form of diplomacy that 
goes beyond what one government official says to another - it is intended, often, to influence 
foreign publics, and is generally indirect in its effects.’79 Relatedly, the advent of public diplomacy 
is commonly traced back to the communications revolution of the late twentieth century and its 
effect on traditional diplomacy, meaning diplomacy carried out in person by ambassadors and their 
envoys; government-to-government engagement.
 It is essential to note, as is done so by Sreberny and Torfeh, that the term public diplomacy 
was coined in the USA and, more specifically, is often accredited to Edmund Gullion and his 
establishment of the Edward R. Murrow Center of Public Diplomacy in 1965.80 Guillon offered the 
following definition of public diplomacy in March 1966; ‘the means by which governments, private 
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groups and individuals influence the attitudes and opinions of other peoples and governments in 
such a way as to exercise influence on their foreign policy decisions.’81 While Culbert recognizes 
these origins of the term, he adds that it was not used officially until the 1980s by the United States 
Information Agency (USIA), although he accepts that the USIA had engaged in ‘acts’ of public 
diplomacy prior to then.82 Moreover, Culbert argues that the term did not seem to find acceptance 
worldwide until the 1990s, and for many not until after the attacks on the World Trade Center in 
September 2001.83 What, then, does this tell us about the term public diplomacy given the 
reluctance with which it was taken up and the circumstances within which it was later adopted? 
 Indeed Sreberny and Torfeh assign the emergence of new public diplomacy, after the 9/11 
attacks, to a reflection on ‘the changing face of international relations as a range of non-state actors 
gained a role in world politics’ and recognition of the ability of non-governmental organisations to 
‘communicate directly with foreign publics.’84 However, had non-state actors really not played a 
part in world politics prior to this event, or period? Or was the development of this concept more a 
realization on the part of the American government that they needed a means by which they could 
attempt to ‘control’ these autonomous organisations? The answer is neither discernible nor required, 
yet it is worth bearing these ideas in mind when considering the concept of public diplomacy; 
predominantly that the concept emerged in an American context, and evolved within an 
environment in which the American government seemed to be losing some of their control as non-
governmental organisations acted increasingly autonomously. That the term was not accepted by the 
wider milieu per se until after September 2001 is a further illustration of its adoption within an 
atmosphere rife with hostility and a need for explanations.
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 The authors go on to quote James Pamment, that the ‘new’ media landscape ‘challenge[s] 
traditional foreign ministry ‘gatekeeper’ structures’, in order to corroborate their assertion that the 
new public diplomacy reflected the change in international relations due to the ever-enlarging role 
of non-state actors.85 To take up Pamment’s reference of the new media threatening the ‘traditional’ 
diplomatic framework, it is worth considering earlier forms of media, such as the press, aspects of 
which have been ‘outside’ of this ‘official’ structure for the duration of the twentieth century. 
 Take for example the Northcliffe Press; a conglomerate of newspaper titles owned by Lord 
Northcliffe, formerly Alfred Harmsworth, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. In the 
years preceding the First World War, Lord Northcliffe and his press, particularly the Daily Mail, 
were accused of scaremongering as he pursued an editorial policy which publicized the expansion 
of the German Navy and the potential threat it posed to Britain.86 Accordingly, his preoccupation 
with the state of British naval defenses reached its pinnacle with the Daily Mail ‘Naval Scare’ of 
1909 which witnessed the declaration, in the issue of the 17 March, that ‘there is nothing between 
sea supremacy and ruin.’87 Lord Northcliffe was clearly using the medium of his newspapers to 
both inform the reading public of the situation, which he deemed so dire, and also as a means with 
which to lobby the politicians who relied, in part, on the press as a gauge of public opinion. Lord 
Northcliffe later used the Daily Mail in order to organize a protest meeting which caused Arthur 
Balfour88 to declare his opposition to the Declaration of London in 1909, which concerned the laws 
of naval war, in the Commons.89 These are just two of a host of examples which illustrate the 
influence which could be wielded by figures within the media industry. Indeed, Lord Northcliffe’s 
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recognition of the constraints which could be placed upon him, and his press, by the government is 
exemplified by his refusal of Prime Minister David Lloyd George’s first offer of a cabinet post to 
Northcliffe in 1916,90 with the declaration ‘I can do better work if I maintain my independence and 
am not gagged by a loyalty that I do not feel towards the whole of your administration.’91 Lord 
Northcliffe correctly identified that acceptance of such a position would limit his political 
independence, and that of his press, and in retaining his autonomy he remained subservient to no 
one; a position which enjoyed ‘the peculiar advantage of immunity from overthrow by parliament 
or by electors’ as Wickham Steed, editor of The Times, explained in a letter to Northcliffe in 1922.92 
Significantly, Lord Northcliffe also successfully released his newspaper titles, such as The Times, 
from their financial dependence on political parties, thereby helping to bring to an end the dominion 
of politicians within the realm of the press.93
 This brief historical intermission away from the subject of this paper is necessary in order to 
establish the position entertained by British communications media prior even to the establishment 
of the BBC and, accordingly, its relevance lies in the need to provide some sort of prelude to the 
concept of public diplomacy as described in 1965. This may be offered in the conception of the 
Fourth Estate, the origins of which are commonly attributed to Edmund Burke in the late eighteenth 
century. Implicit in this concept is recognition of the three estates of the realm; the clergy, the 
nobility and the commoners, which were broadly recognised as the social orders of the Middle Ages 
and Early Modern period in Christian Europe. But in referring to the Fourth Estate, Burke was 
suggesting that there existed an alternative group; writers, reporters; the Press. In 1840, Thomas 
Carlyle explained Burke’s hypothesis of the Fourth Estate within his lecture series on Heroes;
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‘Burke said that there were Three Estates in Parliament; but, in the Reporters’ Gallery yonder, 
there sat a Fourth Estate much more important far than they all. It is not a figure of speech, or a 
witty saying; it is a literal fact, - very momentous to us in these times. Literature is our 
Parliament too. Printing, which comes out of Writing...is equivalent to Democracy...Whoever 
can speak, speaking now to a whole nation, becomes a power, a branch of government, with 
inalienable weight in law-making, in all acts of authority...It matters not what rank he had...the 
requisite thing is, that he have a tongue which others will listen to.’94
 A dismissal of, or at least a lack of scrutiny given to, the idea of the Fourth Estate seems to 
suggest that the communications revolution of the mid-late twentieth century presented an entirely 
new obstacle which governments had to deal with. Whereas, consideration of earlier medias in the 
twentieth, and even nineteenth, century might offer a more useful historical contextualisation in 
terms of the evolution of the role of media, especially as regards its position within and alongside 
the political sphere. As such, I will consider my research against this framework of analysis as well 
as examining it in relation to the concept of public diplomacy in order to establish the usefulness of 
the term.
 A further reflection on Pamment’s reference to the foreign ministry ‘gatekeeper’ structures 
might contrast this description with that of Philip Taylor’s characterization of the international news 
gathering agencies as the ‘gatekeepers’ of international news.95 In which direction is the information 
really passing through these ‘gates’? And who is actually in control in these acts of public 
diplomacy? Those who outline, plan, and delegate, or those who hold the information in the first 
place?
 One last comment is necessary in relation to Sreberny and Torfeh’s remark on the ‘evolution 
of public diplomacy from one-way communications to a two-way dialogue [which] supposedly 
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treats publics as co-creators of meaning and communication.’96 Did this communication ever only 
happen in one direction? Surely the very essence of the word communication insinuates a response 
of some kind? The Latin verb communico, meaning ‘to share’, corroborates the idea that 
communication is an exchange of information, or a means of connection between people or 
places.97 As will become evident in the second chapter of this paper, in the case of Iran there existed 
numerous communications in relation to BBC content, frequently between at least three parties 
following a controversial broadcast. 
Persian Service - Soft Power and Propaganda
 The second term chosen by Sreberny and Torfeh as fitting for the purpose of their study is 
soft power. They rightly reference Joseph Nye, an American political scientist, who first coined the 
term in 1990.98 In a more recent article, Nye defined power as ‘the ability to affect others to obtain 
the outcomes you want,’ and thus regards soft power as ‘getting others to want the outcomes that 
you want’ - cooperation rather than coercion.99 The media’s ability to shape the preference of 
others, to influence, makes it a key tool of soft power. For example the expansion of the BBC 
external services, and the creation of the Voice of America between 1940-1944, can be seen as 
wartime soft power resources.
 The authors also briefly reference Herb Schiller and his argument that soft power is actually 
a euphemism for cultural imperialism; an assessment which they return to later in the book, albeit 
briefly.100 It is worth pausing to consider the concept of cultural imperialism which emerged within 
28
96 Sreberny and Torfeh, Persian Service, p. 15.
97 Charlton T. Lewis, An Elementary Latin Dictionary (1890), http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?
doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0060%3Aentry%3Dcommunico. 
98 Joseph S. Nye, Jr. ʻSoft Powerʼ, Foreign Policy, No. 80, (Autumn, 1990), pp. 153.171.
99 Joseph S. Nye, Jr. ʻPublic Diplomacy and Soft Power,ʼ Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, Vol. 616 (Mar., 2008), pp. 94-95.
100 Sreberny and Torfeh, Persian Service, p. 15.
American media studies in the 1970s in reference to the alleged dominance of American 
entertainment commodities and cultural images.101 Moreover, its prominence as a concept coincided 
with the great economic expansion in the South of American-based transnational corporations, thus 
would suggest that the need to explain the actions of non-state actors was already being addressed 
prior to the notion of public diplomacy.102 It is essential to note, however, that the emergence of the 
concept of cultural imperialism can not be confined solely to ‘western’ discourse, as its use was 
also promoted by the Non-Aligned Movement in Algiers in the early 1970s, and Franz Fanon 
expressed his own notion of cultural imperialism in his work The Wretched of the Earth as early as 
1963.103 In turn, the Iranian thinker Ali Shari‘ati, often considered the ideologue of the Iranian 
Revolution of 1978-79, built his own concept of cultural imperialism in order to address the 
situation in Iran, the roots of which he finds in the rule of economic materialism; the value-system 
used by European countries for their own benefit.104 Shari‘ati’s conception of cultural imperialism 
is certainly worth considering in relation to the idea of public diplomacy in the case of Iran.
 Aside from the possible similarities with cultural imperialism, Guy Golan offers a useful 
distinction between soft power and public diplomacy as the following; ‘the soft power approach is 
focused on government-to-citizen engagement, [while] the mediated public diplomacy approach is 
focused on government-to-citizen engagement that is mediated by a third party - the global news 
media.’105 Relatedly, and significant to this study, Taylor refers to the quasi-autonomous position 
often enjoyed by media ‘external services’ within the diplomatic establishment.106 These services 
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appear to exist between a number of structures, but are not bound to any of them. The BBC Persian 
Service, for example, is patently a component of the BBC, based in London, and yet it broadcasts 
from its office in Teheran - connected by any number of communications, yes, but to an extent free 
from the direct jurisdiction of central command. On the other hand, its base in Teheran could easily 
fall under the administration of the Iranian authorities. But, as a British corporation, which is 
financed by the British FCO, the British embassy (when in situ) clearly has a vested interest in the 
smooth operation of the BBC Persian Service, and thus the broadcasting service is drawn into the 
realm of diplomatic relations, which naturally attracts the attention of the Iranian government. But 
who is really calling the shots?
 Sreberny and Torfeh also quote Nye regarding the issue of propaganda; a subject which 
seems to underlie most studies of media. Nye writes that ‘if it degenerates into propaganda, public 
diplomacy not only fails to convince, but can be undercut by soft power. Instead it must remain a 
two-way process, because soft power depends, first and foremost, upon understanding the minds of 
others.’107 Through this brief explanation, Nye illuminates the complexity of the web within which 
these terms exist and act; if public diplomacy can degenerate into propaganda then surely the 
differentiation between the two is not so clear cut? Although Nye also asserts that those skeptics 
who treat the term ‘public diplomacy’ as a euphemism for propaganda are missing the point; good 
public diplomacy has to go beyond propaganda in that it must be credible.108 However Taylor 
maintains that credibility does not necessarily equate with the truth, and herein lies a further 
paradox which must be dealt with.109 Indeed Taylor asserts that ‘the very process of selection and 
omission, which is by definition part and parcel of the journalistic profession, brings us back into 
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the realm of propaganda,’ and the question of intent.110 This matter of purpose, and who outlines 
that objective, is critical when assessing the part of the BBC in Iran, and will be taken up in the 
third chapter of this study.
 Within the conclusion of the first chapter, Sreberny and Torfeh admit that their overview of 
the discourses surrounding international communication is not definitive, nor overly critical.111 
Instead they assert ‘that the actual practices and the discourses around these practices were and are 
highly political.’112 Surely this is a natural conclusion to draw given the global context and 
relevance of these discourses, and particularly within an epoch which has seen the face of power 
change, according to Nye; witnessing the increasing power of information, which is elemental to 
the communication industry.113 The remainder of the book provides a detailed historical analysis of 
the workings of the BBC Persian Service during the time periods which the authors had established. 
However the concept of public diplomacy, in relation to the workings of the BBC in Iran, is barely 
touched upon again.
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 Chapter Two - An Assessment of the Archives
 
 Between 1971 and 1977, the BBC came under fire from both the FCO and the Iranian 
embassy for various broadcasts relating to Iran and the Shah. These years witnessed dramatic 
changes throughout Iran. The oil price rises of 1971-1973, from $1 a barrel, to $3, and eventually to 
$11 per barrel, turned into a sudden immense increase in domestic revenue, accounting for 77% of 
government revenue in 1977, which the Shah pumped straight back into the Iranian economy.114 
Internationally Iran was regarded as the new, emerging ‘superpower’ of which the Shah was lauded 
as the ‘Emperor of Oil’, while countries, such as the US and UK, competed to indulge his ego and 
thus gain his favour.115 On the other hand, by 1977 this facade of prosperity was beginning to wear 
thin as the repercussions of inflation hit, itself a consequence of a failure to provide an institutional 
framework alongside which steady economic development could occur, which in turn allowed for 
widespread corruption due to the lack of transparency within government and the judiciary.116 
 In short, the Shah presided over a country which seemed, to those outside of Iran, to be 
flourishing, and yet the majority of her citizens were floundering. This contradiction of images was 
of great concern to the Shah, and his ministers worked tirelessly to ensure that it was a positive 
picture of Iran that was promoted in the international press. This chapter offers a snapshot of the 
image of Iran put forward by the BBC during these years, and the disputes it frequently became 
embroiled in as a result of the BBC’s insistence on maintaining their editorial independence. In 
considering these sources chronologically, it is also possible to discern the mounting enmity 
between the Shah and the BBC.
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  Poetry Festival 
 In order to mark the celebration of the 2500th anniversary of the founding of the Persian 
Empire by Cyrus the Great in 1971, for which the Shah had orchestrated grand festivities for 
visiting dignitaries and put on an opulent ‘show’ of Iranian achievements, the BBC likewise 
arranged various publicities of the events. Their ‘main effort’ was focused on the holding of a 
poetry festival, which they tried to establish and promote as a ‘literary prize’ which would appeal to 
‘serious poets.’117 Labeled ‘The Cultural Heritage of Iran’, the festival attracted contributions from 
more than one hundred and twenty writers, alongside which the BBCPS broadcast programmes on 
the life and works of a number of Persian poets.118 The winner of the event was a Dr. Mehdi Hamidi 
Shirazi, an already distinguished literary figure by 1971, but who had been embroiled in a bitter 
debate with Nima Yusij Ali Esfandiari, over his modern-style poetry, since 1946.119
 Reports on the competition in the Iranian press illustrated two very different views of the 
competition, and the BBC, but are also exemplary of the fractious literary environment which the 
BBC had been drawn into due to Hamidi being cast as the victor. A positive article in Kayhan, the 
leading Persian-language conservative newspaper in Iran, details how the winners went to London 
and were lauded at a reception, attended by Charles Curran, Director General of the BBC, at which 
Hamidi was called the ‘Sovereign of Persian Poetry, a King without throne and without crown, and 
unofficial Poet-Laureate of Persia.’120 Significantly, though, the chief editor of Kayhan, Abd-al-
Rahman Faramarzi, was an active supporter of Hamidi.121
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 On the other hand, the Iranian weekly magazine Firdausi published an article entitled ‘The 
BBC selects a Poet Laureate for us’ which accused the BBC of being out of touch with Iranian 
literature and selecting a ‘second-rate poet’ as the winner.122 In fact, the writer asserts that Hamidi 
had cheated in submitting a poem which he had compiled some twenty years previously, and thus 
implores to the ‘BBC, which is wont to this kind of creation,...please don’t transgress to the area of 
Poetry, a subject from which Dr. Hamidi has lagged behind, for over 30 or 40 years.’123 The 
winning poem, ‘Dar amwāj-e Send’, had indeed won first prize in a similar contest in 1951, and 
Hamidi’s success in the BBC competition came about after a further period of intensified 
confrontation between Hamidi, and his traditional style of poetry, and those advocating ‘modern’ 
Persian poetry.124 In a somewhat goading manner, the article in Kayhan had ended with Hamidi 
‘saying how grateful he is to his opponents and his enemies, as their enmity has been a great 
motivation for some of his best compositions.’125
 The British Ambassador in Teheran, Peter Ramsbotham, followed these events up with a 
letter to the BBC in which he pointed out that the BBC ‘seems to be damaging its image by 
acquiring a reputation for employing and supporting “old brigade” expatriates.’126 However, this 
was only a minor criticism and, in general, Ramsbotham seemed to be pleased with the way in 
which the BBC had helped to mark the occasion. Prior to the proceedings, the Ambassador noted, in 
a memorandum to Mark Dodd of the BBC, ‘with appreciation, what you say about handling things 
as discretely as you can.’127 Manifestly, there was much controversy surrounding the lavish 
celebrations hosted at Persepolis by the Shah. Estimates of its cost ran as high as $600 million, 
34
122 BBC WAC R78/3, 008/1: Telegram from R. Balfour to M. Dodd, (15 November 1971).
123 BBC WAC R78/3, 008/1 - E142: “A. Taheriʼs Report on Press Cuttings”, (15 November 1971).
124 Jafar Moayyad Shirazi, “Hamidi Sirazi”, Encyclopædia Iranica, XI/6, pp. 641-643; available online at http://
www.iranicaonline.org/articles/hamidi-sirazi (accessed online at 6 June 2014).
125 BBC WAC R78/3, 008/1 - E142: “A. Taheriʼs Report on Press Cuttings”, (15 November 1971).
126 BBC WAC R78/3, 008/1: Telegram from R. Balfour to M. Dodd, (15 November 1971).
127 BBC WAC R78/3, 008/1: Telegram from P. Ramsbotham to M. Dodd, (17 July 1971).
while contemporary reports noted the increased poverty in local villages which had felt the impacts 
of inflation, and suffered further from the government’s lack of maintenance of the basic 
infrastructure.128 Indeed, the human cost of these celebrations is also stressed in a report from the 
Middle Eastern Information and Research Project (MERIP), whose authors found that the village 
which had been at the entrance of the ruins at Persepolis had been moved 30km away, and as such 
had been removed from their source of income and thus their future looked ‘bleak’.129 Importantly, 
though, the Middle Eastern Information and Research Project ‘provides news and perspectives 
about the Middle East not available from mainstream news sources’, a remark which could be 
applied to the position held by the BBC.130 That the BBC had to send out a journalist especially to 
cover the events of the 2500 year anniversary shows that they did not, by this stage, have a 
permanent foreign correspondent based in Iran.131 This would also insinuate that the news which 
they covered would be very much ‘mainstream’ given that it was a short, temporary posting.
 A letter from Amir Khosrow Afshar, of the Iranian embassy, to Curran attested to the 
gratitude felt by the Iranian embassy towards the BBC, and the Persian Service in particular, for 
their part in commemorating the 2500th anniversary, and verifies that the news conveyed by the 
BBC was in line with the ‘official’ position. Afshar specifically mentioned the success of the poetry 
festival which he did not doubt was ‘of immense interest to the BBC listeners and augur[ed] well 
for the Anglo-Iranian friendship and amity.’132 Letters from Iranian listeners would seem to ratify 
such a view, with one reading; ‘I enjoyed listening to your poetry competition programs, and I 
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appreciate all the hard work put into these programs. Hearing Persian poetry recited so well from 
the BBC makes me feel very proud.’133
 It is interesting to consider the impact of the BBC holding a poetry festival, such as has been 
detailed above, in so much as it becomes clear that the BBC, in putting together content for their 
foreign broadcasts, went beyond politics and ventured into the cultural and historical realms. 
Evidently the BBC wished to provide Iranian listeners with news, and content, from within Iran. 
However the article in Firdausi hints at a perception of the BBC as imperialistic and of being 
somewhat demeaning in the way in which they went about holding the festival and choosing a 
winner for the Iranians. This condemnation of the imperialistic nature of the BBC is a theme which 
comes up frequently amongst those who wished to disparage the BBC, and the British.
John Bierman
 Having sent a special BBC correspondent to cover the 2500 year anniversary celebrations in 
Iran, by 1972 it was believed requisite to respond to a ‘long felt need for more consistent and 
authoritative news coverage of Iran and adjoining countries for the Persian Service, and for the 
World Service,’ and thus John Bierman was posted to Teheran as a BBC staff correspondent.134
 By September 1972, Bierman had already appeared on the Shah’s radar due to a critical 
report on the public trial of a guerilla who had killed a policeman which, according to the Shah, was 
‘manifestly sympathetic to the policeman’s murderer.’135 Even at this stage the British Ambassador, 
Ramsbotham, notes the Shah’s extreme sensitivity to British public criticism, which had reached an 
‘irrational level in an otherwise extraordinarily well-balanced personality,’ and referred to the 
similar tirade which had occurred prior to the Shah’s visit to England in June of the same year.136 
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 In order to placate the Shah, the Ambassador came to an agreement on a sort of ‘bargain’ 
which he hoped would prevent such emotional outbursts from jeopardizing ‘the special position 
which we [British] have now achieved, including even our prospective defence contracts and trade 
and investment prospects.’137 It is worth noting that Ramsbotham directly connects the impact of 
the media with the potential of British influence in other areas of the Iranian infrastructure.
‘Press Wars’
 The Shah’s ongoing frustration with the BBC continued to grow over the course of 1973 and 
the month of March witnessed a proliferation of correspondence within the FCO on the matter of 
British media and Iran. An article in the Economist, entitled ‘Take it in gulps’ and published on 
Saturday 3 March, had caused particular strife due to the attitude taken in the piece towards the 
resolution of difficulties within the oil industries of Iraq and Iran.138 Furthermore, a reference to the 
Shah as the ‘second banana’ to Saudi Arabia’s Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yamini, in addition to  
mentioning the new deal as something for the Shah ‘to brag about when he gets home from his 
winter holiday in Switzerland’ would surely have angered the Shah.139 A memorandum from 
Ramsbotham on 8 March remarked that the Iranian government was ‘immensely disturbed’ with the 
position taken by the British press and the BBC towards Iran, and referenced the article in the 
Economist and recent BBC broadcasts as having provoked an editorial in Kayhan, on 6 March, 
commenting on the ‘Anti Iranian chorus, with BBC in the lead.’140 The article suggested that 
‘alliances between imperialist circles and communists have taken place against Iran in the past’, and 
an editorial in Mehr-i-Iran, from the 7 March, also ran along the same lines, carrying the heading 
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‘Wretched voice of Colonialism.’141 The BBC specifically was also equated with communist 
clandestine broadcasts against Iran in a ‘bitter editorial in the Persian press.’142 
 Clearly Iranians were caught between fears of possible communist Russian encroachment, 
reflecting the Cold War era in which this study is situated, and also memories of British imperialism 
which were most obviously manifested around the issue of oil. Yet the BBC’s questioning of Iran’s 
purpose in equipping herself with ‘expensive modern arms’ certainly suggests a somewhat 
derogatory attitude towards Iran, and would indicate that the editorial policy of the BBC was not 
always in line with British foreign policy.143
 While the Iranian government had expressed regret at the publication of the article in 
Kayhan, in addition to conveying that they did not want a “press war”, the translation of the original 
feature in the Economist, its issuing as a leaflet in Iran, with a new heading ‘What an oil victory’, 
and its circulation within Teheran and amongst provincial universities presented the Iranian 
government with a problem.144 Their decision ‘not to attack the Economist publicly, for fear of 
drawing more attention to it’, and instead to mount ‘a diversionary attack’ against the BBC, could 
be viewed as an expression of the Shah’s general discontentment with the BBC.145 That the Shah 
had delivered ‘tirades about the British press and the BBC’ to the British Ambassador in both June 
and September of 1972 is illustrative of his growing exasperation with a foreign institution over 
which he seemingly had no control, and thus which vexed him even more.146
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Panorama
 The most extreme manifestation of the Shah’s paranoia with the BBC came in October 1973 
when the BBC correspondent in Teheran, John Bierman, was expelled from Iran. The provocation 
of such action by the Iranian government was an edition of Panorama, broadcast in the UK on 1 
October, entitled ‘Iran: The Barrels and the Guns.’
 The programme Panorama was originally conceived in 1953 as a ‘magazine of informed 
comment on the contemporary scene’ with an emphasis on ‘topicality’ and ‘quality,’ in an attempt to 
explore the possibilities of the new medium of television.147 A broadcast on current affairs which 
became ‘the TV forum where national issues, political, economic, social were debated...the flagship  
of the BBC television’s journalistic fleet.’148 The reporters were essential to its success,149 as they 
sought to provide viewers with ‘a fuller and therefore more accurate story than the News will ever 
have time or opportunity to do,’ but were also hampered by issues of editorial control - a matter 
which will be returned to in Chapter Three.150 By the early 1960s, Panorama held a weekly 
Monday night slot on BBC1 television and was drawing a viewership of eight million people.151 
Over the course of its history, the programme has gone through periods of torpidity as well as those 
of pioneering work in current affairs. Significantly, though, Panorama continues to broadcast on 
BBC television, albeit in a considerably different form to its original concept; evolving in line with 
the changing world and the corresponding needs of its viewers.152 Panorama perseveres in 
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investigating controversies, while itself often being the subject of controversy153 - the 1 October 
1973 edition of the programme is only one in an archive of contentious broadcasts, yet, 
unfortunately for Bierman and the BBC, this particular case aroused the paranoia of the Shah. 
 Interestingly, there is little record of the programme ‘Iran:The Barrels and the Guns’, with 
only cursory mention of its content within various telegrams, in addition to the information 
provided in a BBC audience reaction report. Given the vexation it provoked, in both the Iranian and 
British governments, its salient absence in the archives is striking.154
 A press log in the BBC written archives from the 4th of October does, however, provide an 
explanation of the order of events and directives in relation to the news that Bierman had been told 
to leave Iran. At first the BBC announced that they were ‘investigating a news agency report from 
Teheran that our Correspondent, John Bierman, is being expelled. The BBC has so far received no 
direct confirmation from the authorities in Teheran. He was due back in Teheran today after 
reporting trips to Pakistan and Afghanistan.’155 They later confirmed these reports, adding that 
Bierman has been ‘summoned to the Ministry of Information in Teheran and told that he must leave 
Iran within three days. No reason was given by the official to whom he spoke and when asked to 
see the Director of Information he was told that he was not available.’156 Importantly, the BBC 
reiterated that Bierman had been on a trip to Pakistan and Afghanistan, and thus had not actually 
been in Iran at the time of the broadcast in the UK. Moreover, he had virtually nothing to do with 
the Panorama programme, especially as it was aired on the domestic service.
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 A note put together by the Managing Director of External Broadcasting on the dispute over 
the Panorama programme offers a number of possible explanations for the Shah’s reaction. 
Significantly it comes to light that the Panorama programme provoked a campaign against the BBC 
which originated with Teheran Radio before being taken up by the whole Iranian press.157 
Accordingly, the Panorama broadcast had been viewed by certain opponents of the BBC in Teheran 
as ‘providing a useful pretext for a concerted attack against the BBC and “old colonialists” in the 
UK.’158 Regarding this, the campaign was ‘designed to place Iran in a favorable light in the eyes of 
the people, particularly in the Arab world, who might have taken exception to Iran’s previously 
favorable policy towards Israel.’159 The Shah’s authorization of the establishment of an Israeli trade 
mission in Teheran in the early 1960s is one example of the official Iranian stance regarding Israel; 
severely contrasting with that of her Arab neighbours.160 Although this attitude towards Israel was 
not held by all Iranians, as conversely there were some who identified with Palestinians as fellow 
victims of British imperialism, due to the British Mandatory period in Palestine.161 This was the 
situation against which the Iranian press campaigned, and which the BBC had become inextricably 
involved through obvious association with Great Britain.
 The report continues that the press campaign hoped to place ‘Iran firmly in the ranks of 
Islamic nations which, one Persian newspaper article stated, were united in their condemnation of 
the BBC’s pro-Israel attitude and hostility to Islam.’162 If this reasoning were the case for Bierman’s 
expelling then it would appear that he was simply the victim in a much broader battle; one which 
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had been launched by the Iranian press against foreign interference. Notably, the BBC Persian 
Service is also mentioned as having
 ‘frequently been a cause of irritation to the Shah in the past...and whose reputation it 
might have been hoped to damage in the eyes of the listeners through a general attack 
on the BBC for the slur it was alleged to have cast on Iranian national 
achievements.’163 
In reacting in accordance with the press campaign, the Shah would seem to be listening to the will 
of the Iranian people, while also benefitting himself in the removal of a particular source of anxiety 
to him, given that Bierman had already proved to be as such - as will be illustrated.
 In conformity with this line of reasoning, the memorandum references Bierman’s beliefs as 
to the cause of his being expelled; that the 
‘Panorama row was to enable the Iranians to get rid of him as one of the few foreign 
correspondents in Teheran at a time when the Shah’s Government is facing increasing 
difficulties due to inflation and shortages and may take increasingly repressive 
measures against discontent.’164 
This may have been a reference to the growing hostility towards the regime, and the authority of the 
Shah, which augmented over the course of the 1970s, and was probably all the more noticeable 
given the previous decade of relative calm.165 Indeed the discontent mentioned may have been 
reference to the guerilla movement, a proliferation of which Abrahamian locates in the Siakal 
insurrection on 8 February 1971, and whose activity continued until the Islamic Revolution in 1979, 
causing the Shah considerable concern.166 
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 On the other hand, in a letter to Sir Alec Douglas-Home of the FCO, Curran, Director 
General of the BBC, expressed his own belief that the Shah was so infuriated by the Panorama 
programme due to the brief reference in the programme to land reform.167 As has been mentioned, 
this was a key aspect of the Shah’s White Revolution, but an issue over which the Shah was 
particularly sensitive. The programme of land reform, which entailed the appropriation of land by 
the government in order to redistribute it to the peasantry, was a development which did not sit well 
with the landed elite - both secular and clerical.168 Subsequently land reform was to prove a highly 
contentious issue for the Shah. In relation to the BBC report though, Curran recognised that ‘there 
is a problem here. If we had missed out all reference to land reform we should have been accused of 
ignoring a major element of Iranian progress,’ and thereby jeopardized the journalistic integrity of 
the BBC.169
 The aforementioned memorandum on the Panorama affair includes comment on the idea 
that ‘by expelling Bierman the Iranians have also got rid of the Times and C.B.C. [Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation] stringer, Hilary Brown, and are left only with the Financial Times/
Economist correspondent, who is already publicly under attack.’170 The significance of the press as 
an influential body outside of governmental control has already been assessed, but the existence of 
foreign media offers even more problems for the ruling establishment as there are fewer ways to 
reign them in. In the case of the Shah’s Iran, this might have seemed even more problematic given 
that he was keen to concentrate power around his person.171 The memorandum also explains that 
the correspondents of the international news agencies who remained in Iran were all Iranian 
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nationals ‘and therefore easily controlled,’172 thereby reinforcing the notion that the Shah wanted to 
be rid of any bodies who resisted or disputed his authority and which were not under his command. 
Response of the BBC
 The BBC’s reaction to the forceful action taken by the Shah was one of compliance, while at 
the same time staunchly defending the work of their correspondent. The statement proffered by the 
BBC read as follows; 
‘The BBC has every confidence in the accuracy and impartiality of John Bierman’s 
reporting. This confidence is based not only on his coverage of Iran and neighbouring 
countries since he took up his present appointment in May 1972, but on his previous 
work for the BBC at home and abroad.’173
Moreover, in reference to the Panorama programme itself, it was explained that 
‘The programme included an interview with the Shah at considerable length when he 
was given every opportunity to answer criticisms made of Iran, together with time to 
expand his personal philosophy on the ideas behind the policies he has instituted. 
There is no question of misrepresentation and we are confident that this was an 
objective assessment of the situation.’174
 The extent to which the BBC was willing to support both their editorial impartiality, and Bierman, 
is reflected in a letter to the Times, published on 22 October 1973, from Curran, in response to 
letters to the Times from the Iranian Ambassador and Sir James Bowker over the Panorama 
programme. Curran wrote that he deemed the episode of Panorama to have given an impression of 
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‘major political, social and economic progress under the Shah’s leadership.’175 He continues that he 
is ‘sorry that the Ambassador, reflecting views of his government, should have seen in the 
Panorama evidence of a campaign by the BBC to attack Iranian achievements. That is no part of 
our intention, and never would be.’176
 In the same letter, however, Curran also raised the question of ‘how to reply to critics who 
have not themselves seen a programme..?’177 This comment may have been a surreptitious reference 
to the revelation that the Shah had ordered the expulsion of Bierman without having viewed the 
Panorama documentary. In a telegram from Ramsbotham to the Managing Director of External 
Broadcasting, dated 17 October 1973, he commented that the Iranian Court Minister, Alam, had 
belatedly got the Shah to watch the Panorama programme. 
‘Alam himself has admitted to me that the programme, as a whole, was not too bad 
and certainly that the Shah himself came out of it extremely well. I think the Shah 
may also have taken this view, though I do not think he will be  ready to forgive the 
BBC for a programme which, undoubtably, contained some deliberately slanted 
questions and commentaries.’178
 This information would reinforce the notion that the Shah was more interested in getting 
Bierman out of his country, rather than being upset with the actual documentary programme. Indeed 
documents in the BBC written archives from earlier in 1973, and 1972, show that Bierman had been 
causing the Shah some frustration in his reporting of student troubles and his despatches on the 
trials of alleged terrorists.179 In a bulletin from Teheran, on 26 April 1973, Bierman followed up on 
45
175 Charles Curran. "BBC documentary on Iran." Times [London, England] 22 Oct. 1973: 15. The Times 
Digital Archive. (accessed 2 June 2014).
176 ibid.
177 ibid.
178 BBC WAC: R78/3, 008/1: ʻTelegram from Ramsbotham to Managing Director, External Broadcastingʼ, (17 
October 1973).
179 BBC WAC E58/25/1: Mark Dodd, ʻJohn Bierman Under Fireʼ, (9 May 1973); BBC WAC E58/25/1: Mark 
Dodd, ʻThe Shah and the BBCʼ, (8 September 1972).
a BBC report of a student demonstration at Tabriz University during which two or three students 
were said to have died from head injuries after police broke up the demonstration. Bierman quoted 
the Chancellor of the university; ‘Speaking with the utmost vehemence Dr. Zahedi told me that 
nobody was killed, and nobody was injured, and nobody was arrested. He described the incident as 
a minor one, and denied that police had been called in from outside...’180 Bierman then continued to 
chronicle an account of the incident which he had pieced together from other sources, thereby 
undermining, and questioning, the words of the Chancellor. The memorandum from David Stride, 
in Teheran, to the BBC details how, following Bierman’s despatches, Stride had been summoned by 
the Minister of Science and Further Education, Dr. Kazemzadeh, who proceeded to criticize 
Bierman, ‘remarking on his effrontery at doubting the word of the Chancellor of Tabriz University 
and arguing with him...Dr. Kazemzadeh was shocked that Bierman should have suggested that the 
Chancellor might not be telling the truth.’181 Stride finishes by emphasizing that ‘on this occasion it 
was not our broadcasts that were under attack but Bierman himself, his method of collecting 
information and what was taken to be his disrespectful behaviour towards the Chancellor of Tabriz 
University.’182
 The response of Mark Dodd, head of External Services, to Stride’s report illustrates the faith 
the BBC had in their staff, and their resolution to uphold the quality and standards of journalism 
upon which their profession was based. Dodd writes that he felt ‘Bierman is absolutely right to stick 
to his guns if he is as confident, as he appears to be, of his sources,’ but noted that Bierman was 
‘going to come under increasing pressure.’183 The exchange of telegrams surrounding this 
controversy illustrates the framework within which the BBC and its reporters had to work due to 
their position as a foreign institution, but also touches upon the problems which the Iranian 
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authorities had in relation to foreign media. The aforementioned letter from Curran to the Times, 
after the Panorama incident in October 1973, succinctly appraises the difficulties faced by BBC 
external services by suggesting that the question to be considered as regards the Panorama issue 
was ‘should programmes be prepared in order to please those whom they are reporting, or in order 
to illuminate the situation for those to whom they are addressed?’184
 Magnified criticism
 That sources in the FCO and BBC written archives tend to refer only to broadcasts and 
publications which upset the Shah is testament to the idea that his ministers and officials were 
inclined to ‘serve up to him the bad but omit to tell him about the good’ thereby proliferating his 
sensitivity to criticism in the press.185 
 Indeed it appears that the British FCO made a concerted effort to deliver proof of favourable 
British reporting of Iran to the Shah. For example in December 1973, a memo from Ramsbotham 
details a request from the Iranian Prime Minister for the text of a broadcast about Iran by Peter 
Avery, lecturer in Persian Studies and Fellow at King’s College, Cambridge, which he deemed 
‘excellent’ and wanted to show the Shah.186 Aired on the BBC Overseas Services on 1 December 
1973, the programme, entitled ‘Iran: Oil and the Shah’s Arab Neighbours’, described Iranian 
armaments, renewed relations between Iran and Iraq, and the Shah’s understanding of Iran’s 
position in relation to Saudi Arabia and oil.187 Relatedly, Avery referred to Iran as ‘the West’s hope 
of stability and good sense in its Middle Eastern reservoir of energy’, and remarked that ‘the Shah 
has made it clear that he follows nobody [and] has no need to.’188 The FCO did not miss the chance 
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to emphasize this flattery of the Shah, and perhaps an attempt to repair the straining of relations 
following the Panorama affair.
 Moreover, the broadcast also referenced the Irano-British investment talks which were 
taking place in Teheran, and commented that ‘particularly now must Britain welcome Iran’s 
international initiative.’189 In this instance, it might be argued that the British FCO was using the 
BBC to corroborate, and strengthen, the friendly stance taken by the British towards Iran. An FCO 
document, entitled ‘Post Mortem on Iran,’ which dealt with British policy in Iran in the 1970s, 
clearly outlined the basis of the British relationship with the Shah during the 1970s, stating that;
‘The Shah’s pro-Western stance and the oil wealth offered us major opportunities. 
The decision taken in 1969 to end our established treaty relationships with the 
Gulf States by the end of 1971 made it important for us to cultivate Iran...We also 
secured major commercial benefits. It was understandable therefore, that 
Ministers took the view that we should support the Shah warts and all.’190
A letter from Peter Westmacott, of the Middle East Department in the British government, to David 
Miers, of the FCO, further accentuates that the UK ‘undoubtably flattered and humoured the Shah - 
perhaps excessively’ during the 1970s, as did other countries.191 Westmacott adds that 
‘unfortunately, the UK needed the Shah more than the Shah thought he needed the UK.’192 And 
thus, when relations between the two countries were soured, in this case due to an act by the BBC, 
the delicately balanced partnership between the FCO and the BBC came under scrutiny from all 
sides.
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A Delicate Balance
 In relation to the Irano-British investment conference, mentioned above, it is interesting to 
note that the BBC did not send anyone to cover it. The talks took place in Teheran in November 
1973, two months after Bierman had been expelled from Iran. While the Shah and Iranian 
government had by this point come to agree that the episode of Panorama had been ‘a good 
programme of some propaganda value to Iran’ and ‘probably regret[ed] their hasty action’ in exiling 
Bierman, it was noted that the BBC was still feeling ‘understandably sore’ over the matter.193 
Evidently, the BBC felt that their journalistic credibility had been undermined, and they had also 
not been backed by the FCO over the issue. Indeed members of the British government realized that  
there was little they could do to influence the British press,194 and in a controversial situation, such 
as that surrounding the Panorama affair, the distance between the BBC and the FCO was best 
observed in order to maintain amicable official relations between Britain and Iran.
$ On the other hand, it was also understood that the BBC was undeniably woven into the 
‘face’ of the British presence abroad, and thus the campaign against the BBC in Iran, after the airing 
of Panorama on 1 October, was seen as also being indirectly hostile towards the British 
government; a matter which necessitated FCO involvement.195
Possible ‘end’ of the Persian Service
 A BBC Persian Service broadcast on 21 June 1976, summarizing a survey on Iran which had 
been published in the Financial Times, once again upset the Shah and led to renewed debate over 
the value of the Persian Service. The radio presenter explained that the article had referred to 
‘doubts as to the industrial capacity of Iran, and its competitiveness in the sphere of exports, which 
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is the Shah’s real aim,’ as well as referencing the low level of agricultural production, and the ever-
widening gap between the rich and poor - all sensitive issues for the Shah.196 The BBC maintained 
that their summary of the article was both reasonable and balanced, however they did come to 
accept that the Shah would be more worried about a broadcast in Persian to a widespread audience 
than about material in an English newspaper.197 
 Significantly, this particular case seems to have led to a full-scale examination by the FCO 
of the benefit of the Persian Service, which included consideration of ‘whether it should be altered 
in any way or indeed abolished altogether.’198 The British Ambassador in Teheran at the time, Sir 
Anthony Parsons, provided his own detailed assessment of the Persian Service which came down 
conclusively in favour of discontinuing the service. He highlighted that it was ‘well known that the 
vernacular service is financed by the FCO and is therefore firmly considered by the Iranians as an 
official organ of the government.’199 In fact he is somewhat disparaging of the BBCPS, recounting 
that it ‘will never be considered as other than a propaganda organ of HMG200, innocuous most of 
the time, irritating some of the time, and downright malevolent toward the Iranian government and 
its policies and aspirations on occasions.’201 Clearly, Parsons often found the BBCPS an irritation in 
terms of maintaing amicable diplomatic relations between the two countries. He was not however 
against the BBC in general, as he considered the BBC World Service to be the ‘most powerful 
single information tool’, it was just the Persian Service which he had a problem with.202
 Nicholas Barrington, of the FCO, expressed his surprise at the nature and strength of 
Parsons views on the BBCPS, and assessed that the BBC would recognise them as ‘an example of 
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the FCO’s concern with short-term political expediency which they find inhibiting to the much 
longer-term aims of external broadcasting.’203 The documents surrounding this FCO review of the 
Persian Service offer a particularly useful insight into the web of views and partnerships which 
existed between the FCO and the BBC, and will be discussed more thoroughly in the following 
chapter.
Continued Paranoia
 Evidently, the FCO concluded that the BBCPS was of some use, and the service continued 
to function as before.204 Yet less than a year later an episode of ‘PM Reports’205 aired on Radio 4 in 
the UK, on 27 February 1977, caused further controversy and an exchange of telegrams between the 
FCO and the BBC ensued. During the course of the programme, Brian Widlake had interviewed 
Margaret Laing on her new biography of the Shah.206 The key issue for the Iranian embassy, 
however, was not the book, but the description, by Widlake, of the Shah as running ‘a country 
which is one of the most repressive regimes in the world, a formidable police state.’207 In another 
letter, written directly to Curran, the Iranian Ambassador was unequivocal in stating the Iranian 
government’s dissatisfaction with the BBC; ‘The patent prejudice of the interviewer makes 
ludicrous any pretense of impartiality which one is constantly reminded are the hallmarks of the 
BBC’s policy as a public corporation.’208
 This dialogue is particularly notable in that it was over a domestic broadcast, and as Wilson 
notes, this was ‘the first time [he had] been hauled over the coals about a Home Service 
51
203 FCO 8/2762: Telegram from N J Barrington to A Parsons, (20 July 1976).
204 FCO 8/2762: Telegram from N J Barrington ʻThe BBC Persian Serviceʼ, (14 June 1976).
205 BBC Radio 4ʼs early evening news and current affairs programme which began in 1970.
206 Margaret Irene Laing, The Shah, (1977).
207 BBC WAC R78/3, 008/1: Letter from W E H Whyte to N M Wilson, (24 March 1977).
208 BBC WAC R78/3, 008/1: Letter from Parviz C. Radji to Charles Curran, (17 March 1977).
broadcast.’209 As such, it would appear that the Shah’s paranoia with the foreign press was as rife as 
ever. 
Another Panorama Episode
 On 2 May, 1977, the Panorama team once again turned their gaze on Iran. This time, amidst 
David Dimbleby’s interview with the American President Jimmy Carter, the matter of human rights 
in Iran came up - an issue which had been brewing throughout the 1970s but came to the forefront 
of the political stage through Carter’s election platform.210 The Iranian Ambassador, Parviz Radji, 
wrote to Charles Curran making plain the exasperation felt by the Iranian embassy towards the BBC 
by this point. Radji admonished that ‘the presupposition of Iran’s guilt of infringing basic human 
rights...which was so clearly insinuated by the unworthy example of your interviewer, provides yet 
another instance of the BBC’s undisguised, not to say gratuitous, hostility towards Iran.’211  He 
continues to express, in a third letter in the series, that the Iranian embassy desired ‘an explanation 
as to why Iran was isolated for a series of questions on human rights which, by their nature and the 
persistence with which they were put, were palpably intended to taint Iran’s image before millions 
of viewers.’212 Given the Shah’s acknowledged obsession with how he was perceived by the West, 
this would clearly have been of great concern to him.
 Interestingly, an article in the Times, published on 9 May 1977, written by Lord Chalfont, 
who had recently returned from a trip to Iran, commented on the presence of a delegation from the 
International Red Cross who were there inspecting Iranian prisons, ‘although you would have to 
search the press of the western world with a powerful telescope to detect any mention of it.’213 This 
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remark would seem to indicate that the European and American press were, to some extent, 
pursuing a favourable editorial policy towards Iran, perhaps at the bequest of their various 
governments who, in the majority, were keen to mollify Iran. Indeed an MERIP report, from August 
1977, observed that while the new Carter administration in the US had declared a policy of 
‘advancing the cause of human rights throughout the world’, there had been a ‘determination to 
ignore or cover up violations of human rights perpetrated by the allies of the US’, of which Iran was 
one.214 This might help to explain the displeasure communicated by Radji over what was perceived 
as ‘the entrenched attitude of hostility towards Iran demonstrated by the BBC...which my 
government has occasion to note with great regret and will bear in mind,’ especially given that the 
press in other countries appeared to be accepting the Iranian official line.215 The US press, for 
instance, and especially the New York Times, treated ‘government press releases as hard news’ and 
repeated ‘court propaganda with few reservations’, and thus the Iranian embassy could not seem to 
understand why the BBC was not doing the same.216
 That Curran’s response refers to the favourable light in which Iran, and her interests, had 
been reflected in recent BBC programmes, and that he ‘should not wish to see that picture 
changed’, does seem to support the idea, however, that there existed some sort of policy which 
sought to pacify Iran.217 The Iranian oil boom of 1973-77 had certainly led to an increased interest 
from Western countries in Iran and, for the remainder of the decade - until the revolution of 1979 - 
the Iranian regime predominantly served the interests of ‘foreign investors, comprador capitalists, 
and Western imperialists’, to the despair of Iranian society.218 This international situation in which 
Iran, and her oil deposits, were embroiled surely played a significant part in the line taken by 
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Western commentators on the state of affairs in Iran. Her oil seemed to have bought her both an 
increased GNP219 and a free pass from criticism in the Western press. Thus when the BBC broke 
from this mold, the Iranian embassy was less than impressed.
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Chapter Three - A Synthesis of Ideas
 This chapter will predominantly provide a synthesis of the previous two chapters, and 
thereby attempt to provide some sort of answers to the questions put forward in the introduction. A 
closer examination of the actual audience of the BBCPS, for instance, allows us to view the issue of 
the BBC’s influence in Iran from another angle. Analysis of the FCO review of the BBCPS, which 
took place in 1976, also provides details which help to elucidate the differences in policy between 
the two organisations. The perspectives offered through such analyses provide a fuller picture of the 
situation in which the BBCPS functioned, and thus make it somewhat easier to approach the issue 
of the dynamic which existed between the FCO and the BBC in Iran, and in turn to question the 
response and attitude of the Shah to this state of affairs. In turn, the second part of this chapter will 
try to explain the usefulness of viewing the research undertaken in this study within the theoretical 
framework of the Fourth Estate, an alternative to that of public diplomacy and soft power used in 
The Persian Service, the work reviewed briefly earlier on in this study. 
Audience of the Persian Service 
 Surveys of the BBC Persian Service, undertaken by the National Institute of Psychology, 
Teheran, in 1965 and 1969/70 for the BBC, significantly undermine the Shah’s belief in the 
widespread influence of the BBCPS. In the first place, the 1969/70 review of the service found that 
it had a regular audience of 4% and a total audience of 9%.220 It is important to note that this figure 
only pertains to literate male adults (no other details of these specifications are given) who lived in 
homes with access to a radio in and around Teheran, Kerman, Isfahan and Abadan.221 The 1965 
survey also covered Tabriz and Shiraz. The figures for regular listeners were far higher in the cities 
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outside of Teheran, and particularly in Abadan where 36% of the respondents claimed to listen to 
the BBCPS regularly or irregularly.222 This figure is probably not so surprising when taking into 
account that a considerable proportion of those living in Abadan were expatriates who worked for 
the oil companies. It is also interesting to note that British expatriates were a ‘very low priority 
audience’ according to the FCO, and therefore that the highest recorded listenership of the BBCPS 
probably included a high proportion of expatriates is indicative that the BBCPS was not fulfilling 
FCO strategies.223 Some years later, in late 1974, a United States Intelligence Agency (USIA)-
sponsored survey also indicated, in its preliminary findings, that only around 1.5% of ‘urban 
respondents’ listened at least once a week thereby insinuating that the listenership was not 
increasing in any obvious manner over the time period covered in this study.224
 While these surveys clearly do not provide the full picture; they do not allow for female or 
non-literate listeners and only cover inhabitants of the major cities/towns, they do suggest that the 
proportion of Iranians who listened regularly to the BBCPS was somewhat limited. However, 
according to Cyrus Ramtin, a senior official of National Iranian Radio & Television, audience 
research in 1975 had shown that listeners were more numerous for the BBCPS than any other 
foreign station broadcasting in Persian.225 Indeed where the BBCPS had had a regular audience of 
4% in 1969/70, the Soviet station, Radio Teheran, had only 1% of regular listeners.226 These 
comparative figures would suggest that the BBC was winning the battle over foreign news 
hegemony in Iran, as referred to in the first chapter of this study, but that their influence was far 
more limited than the outbursts of the Shah would lead us to believe. 
56
222 FCO 8/2762: Review of the BBC Persian Service, (July 1976).
223 FCO 8/2762: Telegram from N J Barrington to Sir A D Parsons on “BBC Persian Service”, (20 July 1976).
224 FCO 8/2762: Review of the BBC Persian Service, (July 1976).
225 ibid.
226 ibid.
 In Sir Anthony Parsons’ memorandum on the Persian Service, to Nicholas Barrington of the 
FCO, the Ambassador corroborated this view, commenting that during his extensive travel of the 
Iranian provinces ‘none of the Persians [he had] met have ever raised the subject of the Persian 
Service.’227 While this evidence is not conclusive, of course there may have been no reason to bring 
up the BBCPS in conversation with the Ambassador, it does nonetheless, in combination with the 
figures from the surveys, continue to suggest that the number of people actually listening to BBCPS 
broadcasts was relatively small. Moreover the issue of ‘unscreened industrial electrical 
interference’ is mentioned a number of times, proving to be particularly bad in Teheran, and the 
Chief Engineer of the BBC External Services agreed that the signal ‘left much to be desired’ for the 
ordinary listener in Iran.228 Such grievances might also lessen the listenership. 
 While we do not have audience figures for specific BBCPS broadcasts, which would 
provide a far clearer indication of the potential influence of the BBC in Iran, the numbers which 
emerge from the aforementioned surveys do suggest that the paranoia of the Shah was unjustified. 
Instead, a comment in a document entitled ‘A Brief Case for External Broadcasting and the BBC 
Persian Service in Particular’ which reads ‘the Persian Service comes from time to time into 
conflict with the Shah and his government though there is little to suggest that these irritations are 
shared by our listeners’ seems to offer a more valid and rational evaluation.229 This view is also 
substantiated through consideration of the content broadcast by the BBC across a wider timescale, 
such as between 1971-77, in comparison to focusing on specific ‘moments’ which are historically 
significant due to other political implications, and which the periods researched in the Tuning In 
project could be accused of being.  
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A Divergence in Policies
 A document in the BBC written archives, referred to above, entitled ‘A Brief Case for 
External Broadcasting and the BBC Persian Service in Particular’, describes the outcomes of the 
review of the Persian Service. A number of issues, over which the FCO and the BBC were at odds 
with one another, are highlighted, in turn helping to expound the relationship between the two 
institutions in relation to the BBCPS. Firstly, the BBC viewed its external services as an ‘instrument 
of long-term influence’ which set it apart from other government information work.230 The views 
expressed by Anthony Parsons, regarding the Persian Service, on the other hand exemplified ‘the 
short-term political expediency’ of the FCO which the BBC found particularly inhibiting.231 Thus 
there was an apparent, and fundamental, difference of interests from the start, relating to who the 
target audience was and what the goals of British intervention in Iran were. 
 Relatedly the review highlights the emergence of a new economic and educated class in 
Iran; who are ‘hungry for ideas and information’ for which they primarily have to turn to foreign 
radio.232 While acknowledging that Iran was a country of ‘strategic importance’ to Britain, as was 
discussed in the first chapter in terms of the loose alliance versus Soviet expansion, and held a 
significant economic potential for the British, the review does not directly link these British 
interests to the pursuit of an obvious media policy, in the manner of public diplomacy.233 This is in 
contrast to the views of Peter Ramsbotham, the British Ambassador to Iran between 1971-1973, 
which were noted in chapter two. Instead, the review emphasizes the potential impact of a ‘free’ 
press. The restrictions of the dissemination of news, and expression of ideas, in the Iranian system 
meant that there was a market hungry for something the BBC could offer; ‘a free voice speaking 
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with integrity.’234 And it was over this point that the FCO and BBC surely faced a struggle as the 
BBC might have perceived directives from the FCO as impeding the editorial freedom which was 
so highly valued, while at the same time the FCO could argue that BBC broadcasts which ran 
counter to British foreign policy were surely undermining the integrity of the British image. 
 Finally the review, which argued in favour of the case of the BBCPS, refuted the argument 
that the BBCWS was of far more use to the British government, put forward by Parsons, given that 
British Council estimates suggested that only around 2% of the Iranian population spoke English to 
a reasonable standard, and thereby could listen to, and understand, the BBCWS.235 As has already 
been mentioned, it was the Iranians, not foreign expatriates, who the FCO wished to target, and 
possibly influence. Therefore in order to reach the maximum audience, it was clearly necessary to 
broadcast in the vernacular language, which the BBCPS did. 
 The assessment of FCO sources provided in chapter two, in conjunction with the above 
evaluation, would suggest that the partnership between the FCO and the BBC, in relation to the 
BBCPS, was one in which the FCO wanted the BBC on their side, more than the BBC thought they 
needed the FCO. In point of fact, if the BBC external services had not been bound to the FCO for 
financial reasons, then the BBC may have felt few obligations to the FCO. Nevertheless, this does 
not mean that the BBC were against the FCO by any means; their editorial policy and content still 
represented a British point of view, but they did not view British foreign policy as the guidelines for 
their own broadcasting policy.  
Beholden to Principles
 In light of such an appraisal, it becomes increasingly apparent that the Shah’s frustration 
with the BBC was relatively futile. An exchange between Ellingworth, of the British Embassy in 
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Teheran, and Nadim, Head of the Minister’s Secretariat, was related in a letter from Ellingworth to 
the Middle East Department of the FCO in London, and is worth quoting; 
‘There then followed a discussion in which we went over the usual ground about the 
position of the BBC...Nadim said that he hoped we would “put an end” to the sort of 
incident about which he had complained. I said that although I would report what he had 
told me, I could not possibly undertake this on anybody’s behalf. I was sure the FCO 
would also regret any adverse effects such broadcasts might have, but Nadim must 
know that we did not control the BBC.’236 
This was the manner in which the two organizations were affiliated, with each aware of the others 
positions and views, but at the same time beholden to their own principles. In late 1978, David 
Owen, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, wrote to Sir Michael Swann, Chairman of the 
BBC; 
‘As you know, I am a strong believer in the independence of the BBC and of the value 
of the BBC’s external broadcasts. I have therefore been scrupulous about defending 
your independence at all stages. I believe it would be gravely damaging to the long term 
futures of Britain’s standing in the world if there was to be an attempt at governmental 
interferences.’
That Owen wrote this at a time when the situation in Iran was fast deteriorating, particularly in 
relation to British interests, is exemplary of the consistency in the approach of the FCO towards the 
BBC, despite their frequent differences. Moreover, Owen’s assertion of the independence of the 
BBC, truly reveals that it was the BBC who were calling the shots on their own work.
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The Persian Service as a member of the Fourth Estate
 In light of the above assessment, it could be suggested that it is more appropriate to situate 
the BBCPS within the framework of the Fourth Estate, rather than see it as a tool of public 
diplomacy. After all, as the sources referenced in this study have illustrated, the British FCO did not 
control the BBC; it could only express its frustration with the organization. And so, in accordance 
with the idea of the Fourth Estate, if the work of the BBCPS is positioned within the structure of 
the media, rather than that of the government which the concept of public diplomacy implies, the 
BBCPS is viewed through an entirely different lens. 
 The media, then, in its own right, has a number of responsibilities, described by Charles W. 
Bray in 1974 as being threefold; to cover the breaking of a story, to investigate, and to reflect.237 
The first of these entails the obvious reporting of news, but it is the second two responsibilities 
which are perhaps most interesting to consider, and also most relevant to the case studies offered in 
the previous chapter. In the first place, the investigative nature of reporting, such as that 
demonstrated by John Bierman during the student strikes in Teheran in 1972, requires questioning 
everything and everyone in order to discern the truth. Even more so, it entails attempting to refute 
all one is told until it is proven to be verifiable. Naturally, such methods of reporting are intrusive, 
and thus, in a country such as Iran in the 1970s, would cause the government considerable 
grievances. As has been discussed previously, in the 1970s various groups were posing a challenge 
to the authority of the Shah. If foreign media also appeared to be questioning the Shah’s control, as 
the Shah believed to be the case, then this was a further worry for the Shah. Thus he monitored the 
foreign press with a vigilant eye, just as with the Iranian media, which faced heavy censorship. He 
simply could not afford to have another group in opposition, especially given the potential 
widespread form of the medium and its capacity to influence - both at home and abroad.
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 This thought on influence brings us to the last of the three responsibilities of the media 
outlined by Bray; the need to reflect. By this he suggests that it is the role of the media to record 
and convey the views of the public.238 Thus instead of simply commentating on affairs of the state 
for the public to digest, the media should also communicate the ideas of the people to the 
government (something the BBCPS might claim it was doing in its extensive reporting of 
opposition to the Shah in the months leading up to the revolution in early 1979); thereby promoting 
multi-directional communication instead of simply being a top-down process. A notion which 
would not sit well with the Shah’s increasing centralization of power, itself a one-way system. And 
this leads us succinctly back to the idea of the Fourth Estate, as elucidated by Carlyle, and the 
hypothesis that governments across the globe had been attempting to combat the influence of the 
press for the preceding century; the challenge faced by the Shah was not a new one.239 
 First consider the hierarchy implicit in the relationship between the first three estates; the 
nobility, the clergy and the remainder of the population. Each group has its established place in 
society, and understands who wields authority over whom. (While this is predominantly relevant to 
medieval and early modern European states, the idea can be expounded to be applicable to other 
nations - the case of Iran being one such country given the separation between the monarchy, the 
clerics and the commoners - the bazaari being the additional group.)240 Then contemplate the 
position of the press - the fourth estate - within this hierarchy; there is no obvious place for it. It 
seems to sit beyond the other three categories of society; representative of them all, but beholden to 
none. 
 Now the repetition of Carlyle’s words is necessary to explicate the position enjoyed by the 
press; ‘Whoever can speak, speaking now to a whole nation, becomes a power, a branch of 
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government.’241 So the press, as the fourth estate, wields a power of its own and yet is duty-bound 
only by the principles of its profession.242 Moreover, while the media is clearly not a branch of 
government per se, that it is equated to being one is illustrative of its position vis a vis the 
government; the key difference between the two being that a government is elected, in some form, 
and has legislative powers whereas the the media is self-appointed and commands a largely illusory 
power - albeit one which can have momentous effects. 
 Where, then, does the evaluation of the BBC Persian Service fit in relation to this framework 
of the Fourth Estate? Essentially, the Shah became infuriated with the ability of the BBCPS to 
exercise its influence given its nature as a media organization.243 However, given that the BBCPS 
was a foreign institution, the Shah could not impose the same restrictions on it as he had done with 
the Iranian press. This was ever more so the case due to the Shah’s political alliance with Great 
Britain, and this is where the British FCO became tied up in the web of communications.244
 This analysis does not rule out the possibility of the BBCPS functioning as an aspect of the 
programme of public diplomacy conducted by the British FCO. However if we view the BBCPS 
solely in this manner, then we are, to an extent, legitimating the Shah’s claim that the BBCPS was a 
‘tool’ of the British government. If, on the other hand, we acknowledge that the BBCPS is first and 
foremost a media institution, and therefore locate the work of the BBCPS within the framework of 
the Fourth Estate, as I have attempted to do in this study, then it becomes apparent that the 
contentious relationships which developed between the BBC, the FCO, and the Shah, in relation to 
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the BBCPS, are exemplary of the precarious balance between the British press and government 
which has required consistent surveillance since the beginnings of the popular press in the late 
nineteenth century. However, given the restrictions placed on the Iranian press, the Shah did not 
know how to deal with the independence of the foreign media. His paranoia over his increasingly 
fragile position only augmented his frustration with this seemingly recalcitrant organization. 
 A final comment is necessary to reiterate the idea that within both of the theoretical 
frameworks mentioned, the media is interlinked with government, and indeed it is futile to consider 
them otherwise. Perhaps this is really the fundamental issue which the Shah did not seem to grasp; 
that from its foundation, the press (and later media) was intent on ‘checking’ governmental 
authority on the behalf of the people; its ‘electorate’ if you like. As Bray astutely remarked in 1974, 
‘in the final analysis, government and media are as interdependent as the rest of the world, and it 
will do no good for either party to tell the other that his end of the boat is sinking; it may do some 
good to suggest to both that they start bailing.’245
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Conclusion
An issue of Power
 A consideration of the sources detailing the interaction between the BBC, the FCO and the 
Iranian government between 1971-1977, as was outlined in the previous chapters, brings into focus 
the question of power; in what forms did it exist? And who was wielding it?
 The Shah was certainly fighting a number of battles, both domestically and internationally, 
which, notably, all seemed to center around the desire for influence within Iran, of which the Shah 
held considerably little. This acquisition of power was of particular importance to the Shah given 
that the first half of his reign was marred with the event of the 1953 coup, which had been deemed 
necessary in order to re-instate his rule. This was certainly a situation which the Shah was anxious 
to avoid again at all costs; sacrifices which were met by the Iranian populace as the Shah 
‘effectively dismantled the Constitutional infrastructure he had inherited.’246 The extent of this 
process meant that by the 1970s ‘the national ideal was invested in a single individual who 
identified himself with the reified nation known as ‘Iran’.’247 However, in the course of 
concentrating power in his person, the Shah became oversuspicious of any possible threat to his 
position.
 Importantly, the Shah’s struggle for authority should be contextualized in relation to the 
international scene which was witnessing growing decentralization; particularly in the West where 
countries were seeing power increasingly invested in intra-national bodies and non-governmental 
organisations (NGO’s). Thus the work of the BBC in Iran, particularly as regards cultural 
programmes such as those accompanying the Poetry Festival in 1971, might not have been viewed 
as drastically by the FCO as it was by the Shah. However the animosity of the Shah towards the 
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BBC, and the favourable attitude of the British towards the Shah, meant that there naturally 
emerged contention between the BBC and the FCO. 
 Thus to frame the relationship between the BBC and the FCO in the terms of public 
diplomacy seems to miss the dimension of the political reality that existed. If the BBCPS was really 
a tool of public diplomacy, then it would, for the most part, have been pursuing an editorial policy 
agreed upon by the FCO. Instead, the extent of complaints by the FCO which were centered around 
BBC content would lead us to believe that the FCO did not have as firm a grip on the BBC as it 
might have wished, particularly given that it financed the BBC external services. Sreberny and 
Torfeh identify that the ambiguous nature of the relationship between the FCO and the BBCPS 
depended on the circumstance and on the people in charge.248 However, given such a vague and 
changing partnership, it seems bold to try and place the relationship within the framework of public 
diplomacy, particularly as this would suggest that there existed some linear form of communication; 
starting from within the offices of the British government, and ending in the Iranian audience, but 
with the BBCPS playing an intermediary, while also essential, role. 
Who, how, why?
 Relatedly, an analysis of the audience of the BBCPS, as has been outlined in chapter three of 
this study, is crucial in order to gauge the real impact of the service. Access was a key factor, the 
figures from the surveys denoting that only a fraction of the Iranian population were actually able to 
listen to the radio. As was touched upon earlier, the evolution of technology was not a wholly 
inclusive process. Moreover, given that we can deduce that the ownership of a radio might have 
been deemed something of a luxury, it therefore seems equally reasonable to suggest that those who 
possessed the technology to listen to the BBCPS broadcasts would have been from the upper 
echelons of Iranian society, or at least those with some monetary wealth. Notably, this ‘category’ of 
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people would have been those who the Shah would have been most likely to interact with; and 
therefore a probable source of the Shah’s paranoia. It has been noted that the Shah’s ministers 
actively provided the Shah with favourable excerpts from BBCPS content. Perhaps it is also 
possible to garner from this activity that the Shah would have received information predominantly 
from advisors close to him, again people who would in all likelihood have had access to a radio, 
and therefore representatives of that small segment of the Iranian populace who listened to the 
BBCPS. Through such analysis, it is possible to locate the source of the Shah’s paranoia; his 
attempts to centralize Iranian bureaucracy around himself seemed to simultaneously exaggerate 
issues which he now sought to control. 
 Further research might also question the reasons for which listeners of the BBCPS turned on 
their radios in the first place. Indeed a thorough examination of the Iranian domestic media services 
and press may proffer the idea that those Iranians who turned to the BBCPS as their source of news 
did so due to the dearth of information available to them in any other form, resulting from strict 
censorship rules.249 Surely this is an important answer to the question of why people listened to the 
BBCPS. Moreover, this explanation also goes part way to accounting for the influence the BBC was 
perceived to have; it was almost the only institution which functioned outside of the Shah’s control 
and yet which the Iranian people had access to. 
The Corporation of the Goosequill250
 Accordingly, the analytical framework offered by the concept of the Fourth Estate seems 
fitting for the role played by the BBC in Iran during the 1970s. Indeed given Sreberny and Torfeh’s  
reference to the perception of independent actors as ‘fifth-columnists by foreign powers’ at the end 
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of their introductory chapter, their failure to consider the fourth dimension which preceded the more 
recent concept of the fifth estate is conspicuous through absence.251 All media has some political 
connotations due to the nature of their work - they report news, but more importantly they question 
the status quo. Thus the functions which the concept of public diplomacy seems to assign to the 
media, such as reaching out to the local population, are often already fulfilled, to some extent, by 
the media organizations due to their inherent responsibilities of reporting, investigating, reflecting, 
and, ultimately, producing impartial and informative content. As such, the BBCPS should be 
considered first and foremost as a member of the Fourth Estate, functioning in line with its own 
charter, before and above the policy of the British FCO. The BBC was not to be blamed for the 
Iranian Revolution of 1979, nor was it a ‘mouthpiece’ of the British Government. It functioned in 
the same way as any other media institution, and as the press had for the preceding century, but the 
Shah came in to conflict with the BBCPS due to its independence which he may have considered a 
threat to his power.
 In the mid-nineteenth century, William Thackeray wrote of the press; ‘There she is - the 
great engine - she never sleeps. She has her ambassadors in every quarter of the world - her couriers 
upon every road. Her officers march along with armies, and her envoys walk into statesmen’s 
cabinets. They are ubiquitous.’252 Over a century later, this was still true. Perhaps it was the Shah’s 
failure to appreciate the history of the press, and to acknowledge the power it wielded throughout 
the world, that fostered his paranoia with the BBC. Yet in suppressing the voices of the Iranian 
press, the Shah created an even greater problem for himself by generating space which would be 
filled by some form of media; in this case, a void which was to an extent occupied by the BBCPS. 
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